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I. INTRODUCTION 
In. several respects, the U.S. tax system strives for neutral 
taxation. Neutrality is often concerned with similarly taxing different 
types of income that are economically equivalent.! For example, the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code) taxes interest income in the form of 
original issue discount prior to its receipt, regardless of whether the 
taxpayer uses the accrual or cash method,2 because the instrument can 
be viewed as economically equivalent to earning interest on a bank 
account from which there are no withdrawals.3 There is also the view 
that the law should be neutral in taxing different forms of conducting 
business, so that business, rather than tax, considerations determine 
the form of business operations.4 While the double taxation of C 
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Tax Program, 
University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S. with high honors 1982, Rutgers 
University; J.D. summa cum laude 1985, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1986, New 
York University. I thank Walter Schwidetzky for reviewing and providing helpful 
comments on a draft of this article. Any errors are solely the responsibility of the 
author. 
[ See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without 
Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 727, 
803-04 (1992) (proposing the taxation of certain investment assets by imposing a 
minimum rate of return in order to tax investment assets more equally); Reed 
Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 243, 336 (1992) (proposing a uniform framework to develop rules for consistent 
treatment of financial instruments). 
2 See 1.R.c. § 1272. 
3 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXA nON: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 729 (5th ed. 2005). 
4 See Fred B. Brown, Federal Income Taxation of u.s. Branches of Foreign 
Corporations: Separate Entity or Separate Rules?, 49 TAX L. REV. 133, 193 (1993). 
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corporations5 is inconsistent with this view,6 the treatment of S 
corporations7 and provisions aimed at equalizing the taxation of 
branches and subsidiaries in the cross-border context8 promote tax 
neutrality with respect to the form of conducting business.9 
The branch profits tax10 is an example of a provision directed at 
achieving this latter type of neutrality. Enacted in 1986,11 the purpose 
of the branch profits tax is to bring about more similar tax treatment 
of foreign corporations operating in the United States through U.S. 
branches and U.S. subsidiaries. 12 The branch profits tax attempts to 
promote neutrality by subjecting the U.S. branch earnings of a foreign 
corporation to a second level of U.S. tax upon the deemed remittance 
of the earnings outside of the U.S. branch. 13 This is to approximate 
the second-level tax that occurs in the subsidiary setting when a U.S. 
subsidiary pays dividends to its foreign parent.14 
Unlike the dividend tax in the subsidiary setting, however, the 
branch profits tax can apply even when all of a foreign corporation's 
U.S. earnings are retained for use in the operations of the U.S. 
5 See 1.R.c. §§ 301 et seq. 
6 See generally DEPT. OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL ANO 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 3-5 (1992). 
7 See 1.R.c. §§ 1361-1379. 
8 See I.R.C. §§ 902, 904( d). 
9 See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 135, 140 
(1989) (pointing out that the legislative history of section 902 reflects an intent to 
equalize treatment of U.S. corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and 
those that operate through foreign branches); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 
100TH CONGo 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 
at 888 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook] (stating that section 904(d) is 
intended to bring about more equal foreign tax credit limitation treatment of income 
earned through foreign branches and income earned through foreign subsidiaries); S. 
REP. No. 1983, 85TH CONG., 20 SESS., at 87 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1137 
(stating that one of the purposes for enacting subchapter S is to allow businesses to 
choose their legal forms without undue tax influence). 
IO I.R.C. § 884. 
11 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1241(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2576 
(1986). 
12 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, at 401 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986-3 c.B. (Yo I. 3) 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 432 (1985), reprinted in 
1986-3 c.B. (Yol. 2) 432. 
13 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 403; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433-34. 
14 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432-33. 
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branch,15 what some commentators have referred to as a surtax 
result. 16 Moreover, a typical U.S. subsidiary has greater flexibility in 
retaining earnings as compared to a U.S. branch. 17 The more 
burdensome nature of the branch profits tax appears to create a tax 
bias in favor of operating in the United States through U.S. 
subsidiaries, so that foreign corporations can control the timing and 
the impact of the second-level tax. IS Thus, as currently crafted, the 
branch profits tax fails to promote neutrality adequately. 
This article recommends certain changes to the branch profits tax 
that advance the neutrality policy underlying the provision.19 More 
specifically, the article proposes measures that provide foreign 
corporations operating through U.S. branches with an ability to 
control the timing and impact of the second-level tax that is similar to 
that possessed by foreign corporations operating through U.S. 
subsidiaries. While there may be other ways of achieving neutrality in 
the imposition of second-level taxes,20 the article proposes measures 
that make the branch profits tax more equivalent to the dividend tax 
15 See Brown, supra note 4, at 196-97. 
16 See Institute of International Bankers Says to Liberalize Branch Tax 
Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit., 88 TNT 225-26) [hereinafter Institute of International Bankers Comments]; 
International Commercial Bank of China Rejects Method for Determining u.s. Net 
Equity, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 11, 1989) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 
89 TNT 9-23) [hereinafter International Commercial Bank of China Comments]; 
KPMG Peat Marwick Suggests Modifications to the Branch Profits Tax Regulations as 
Applied to Banking Institutions, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 12, 1989) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 89 TNT 10-15) [hereinafter Peat Marwick 
Comments]. 
17 See infra Part III.B. 
18 See, e.g., Michael Hirschfeld & Shaul Grossman, Opportunities for the Foreign 
Investor in u.s. Real Estate - If Planning Comes First, 94 J. TAX'N 36,38-39 (2001). 
In this regard, there may be many legitimate business reasons for using a branch 
rather than a subsidiary for conducting a U.S. business. Cf Gary D. Sprague, 
Application of Transfer Pricing Rules to Branches and Permanent Establishments -
Electronic Commerce and Intangible Property Aspects, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 
973 (2002) (listing possible business reasons for using a branch as opposed to a 
subsidiary for foreign operations). 
19 It should be emphasized that even with neutrality in the application of second-
level taxes, there would still be significant differences in the taxation of U.S. branches 
and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. See Brown, supra note 4, at 195-200. 
More complete neutrality in taxing branches and subsidiaries could be realized by 
treating a U.S. branch as a separate entity for tax purposes. See id. at 152-58, 193. 
20 Possibilities range from imposing surtaxes without regard to remittances for 
both branches and subsidiaries to partially or fully exempting such structures from 
second-level taxes. 
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that applies in the subsidiary setting, aiming to accomplish what 
Congress apparently set out to do in enacting the branch profits tax as 
a surrogate for the dividend tax.Z1 In addressing these reforms, the 
article examines whether the proposed measures conflict with other 
recognized policies governing the taxation of foreign corporations 
with U.S. branches, ultimately concluding that they do not. 
Part II of this article discusses the branch profits tax, its 
underlying policy goals, and the conceptualization of a U.S. branch 
that was used by Congress in enacting the provision. Part III 
compares the branch profits tax to the dividend tax that applies in the 
U.S. subsidiary setting, pointing out important substantive differences 
in the operation of these taxes. These differences include the surtax 
resulez and the greater flexibility of U.S. subsidiaries in retaining 
earnings. 
Part IV then proposes and analyzes several changes to the branch 
profits tax that would advance neutrality by having the branch profits 
tax function more like the dividend tax. To address the surtax result, 
this Part proposes two changes aimed at increasing the usefulness of 
the current rule that permits a foreign corporation to avoid deemed 
remittances of U.S. branch earnings by reducing the amount of 
liabilities imputed to the U.S. branch. To enhance the flexibility of 
U.S. branches in retaining earnings, this Part recommends providing 
foreign corporations with an election to treat assets as "effectively 
connected," that is, considered as belonging to the U.S. branch for tax 
purposes. While these measures arguably conflict with the policies 
underlying the rules for apportioning interest expense and 
determining effectively connected income, an examination of the 
potential conflicts suggests that the measures are consistent with these 
21 The most direct way of modeling a dividend tax in the branch setting would be 
to monitor and tax directly remittances made by the U.S. branch to other branches of 
the foreign corporation. See 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 145 (1987) 
[hereinafter AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE]. Congress did not use this approach, 
apparently because it felt that such an approach would not be feasible. See BORIS I. 
BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 67-
198 (2003). Congress probably was also influenced by the fact that the United States 
generally does not attach tax significance to interbranch transactions. Cf AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE, supra, at 145 (rejecting a direct monitoring approach in part for this 
reason). However, if the United States were to treat a U.S. branch as a separate 
entity for tax purposes, which would include the recognition of interbranch 
transactions, a direct approach for monitoring and taxing U.S. branch remittances 
should be feasible and appropriate. See Brown, supra note 4, at 152-55. 
22 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
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and other recognized policies governing the taxation of foreign 
corporations with U.S. branches. Part V summarizes and concludes 
the article. 
II. THE BRANCH PROFITS TAX AND ITS POLICY GOALS 
Congress enacted the branch profits tax in order to reduce the 
disparity between the taxation of U.S. subsidiaries and U.S. branches 
of foreign corporations.23 In general, Congress believed that the same 
substantive tax rules should apply to both forms of conducting a U.S. 
business by foreign corporations.24 A U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation is subject to net basis U.S. taxation on its earnings.25 In 
addition, a gross basis U.S. tax (collected by withholding) is imposed 
on dividends paid by the U.S. subsidiary to the foreign parent.26 A 
foreign corporation operating through a U.S. branch is also subject to 
net basis U.S. taxation on its U.S. earnings.27 However, prior to the 
enactment of the branch profits tax, there rarely was a second-level 
U.S. tax on the distributed U.S. profits of a foreign corporation 
23 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432. 
24 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
401. 
25 See I.R.C. §11. 
26 Under section 881(a), a foreign corporation generally is subject to a thirty 
percent tax on U.S. source dividends (along with other FDAP income such as interest 
and royalties), with the tax collected through withholding from the dividend payments 
pursuant to section 1442(a). Dividends paid by a domestic corporation are usually 
treated as U.S. source income. See 1.R.c. § 861(a)(2). The type of taxation imposed 
under section 881(a), that is, gross income subject to flat rates with no allowance of 
deductions, is referred to as gross basis taxation. Tax treaties may reduce or eliminate 
the tax under section 881(a). See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX 
CONVENTION OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1996, arts. 10-12, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
trty/usmodel.pdf [hereinafter MODEL CONVENTION]. 
27 Section 882(a) provides that a foreign corporation is subject to taxation under 
section 11 on its taxable income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a 
trade or business within the United States ("effectively connected taxable income"). 
See I.R.c. § 882(a). Effectively connected taxable income generally is defined as 
effectively connected income less deductions that are properly allocated and 
apportioned to such income pursuant to Treasury regulations. See 1.R.c. 
§ 882(c)(1)(A). Effectively connected income is generally income that bears some 
connection to a foreign person's U.S. business. See 1.R.c. § 864(c); infra notes 109-38 
and accompanying text. The type of taxation imposed under section 882(a), that is, 
gross income less deductions, taxed at graduated rates, is referred to as net basis 
taxation. Tax treaties may reduce or eliminate the tax under section 882(a). See, e.g., 
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at arts. 5,7. 
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operating in branch form.28 No U.S. tax was imposed on inter-branch 
remittances of U.S. earnings. While a second-level withholding tax 
was possible upon the payment of dividends by the foreign 
corporation to its foreign shareholders, the withholding tax applied 
only when at least fifty percent of the gross income of the foreign 
corporation was effectively connected with its U.S. business.29 In this 
regard, Congress understood that nearly all foreign corporations 
operating in the United States through branches avoided the 
withholding tax by keeping their U.S. income below the fifty percent 
threshold.30 The result was that foreign corporations with U.S. 
branches were usually not subject to a second-level tax, while foreign 
corporations with U.S. subsidiaries were, creating a tax incentive to 
operate through a U.S. branch, thus violating tax neutrality. In this 
regard, a second-level tax for U.S. branches functions as a backstop to 
the dividend tax in U.S. subsidiary setting, as without it the dividend 
tax could be avoided by using a U.S. branch to conduct U.S. business 
activities.31 
Congress believed that simply reducing the threshold for applying 
the withholding tax would not sufficiently reduce the disparity in the 
taxation of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries.32 In Congress's view, 
a second-level tax should not depend on whether U.S. income rose to 
some arbitrary level, and that such an approach presented 
administrative problems because it was difficult to know when the tax 
applied and difficult to enforce if it did apply.33 Instead, Congress 
enacted a tax on the U.S. branch profits of a foreign corporation as a 
substitute for the dividend tax that applies to a foreign corporation 
with a U.S. subsidiary.34 Under the branch profits tax, a second-level 
tax generally is imposed on the U.S. earnings of the foreign 
corporation that are treated as remitted outside of the United States.35 
28 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432. 
29 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 401; H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432. 
30 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 401; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432. 
31 
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 140-41. 
32 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037. 
33 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1036-37; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 401-02; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432-33. 
34 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
401-02; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 432-33. 
35 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
403; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433-34. 
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Specifically, section 884(a) imposes a thirty percent tax on a 
foreign corporation's dividend equivalent amount,36 that is, the U.S. 
branch earnings that are treated as remitted outside of the United 
States.37 The dividend equivalent amount is defined as a foreign 
corporation's earnings and profits for the year that is attributable to 
its effectively connected income ("effectively connected E&P"),38 
subject to two adjustments.39 First, effectively connected E&P is 
reduced by any increase in U.S. net equity for the year, and second, 
this amount is increased by any annual reduction in U.S. net equity to 
the extent of the aggregate amount of effectively connected E&P 
accumulated in years after 1986.40 U.S. net equity is defined as U.S. 
assets less U.S. liabilities.41 U.S. assets are generally assets that 
36 I.R.c. § 884(a). Tax treaties can eliminate or reduce the branch profits tax. 
Specifically, many older treaties override the branch profits tax because of their 
nondiscrimination articles, which generally prohibit a treaty country from taxing a 
permanent establishment of a nonresident enterprise less favorably than a resident 
enterprise carrying on the same activities. In this regard, Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(g)(3) 
provides a list of countries whose treaties with the United States as of January 1, 1987 
prevent the imposition of the branch profits tax, provided that the treaty remains in 
effect and has not been modified after January 1, 1987 to expressly allow for the 
imposition of the branch profits tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(g)(3) (1996). More recent 
treaties (and some older treaties) allow for the imposition of the branch profits tax, 
but reduce the rate of taxation to the rate applying to dividends paid to a foreign 
corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. corporation, that rate typically being five or ten 
percent. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 10, paras. 2(a), 9. The 
Code makes direct provision for this as well. See I.R.c. § 884(e)(2); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.884-1(g)( 4)(i)(A) (1996) (if the treaty does not specify a rate on branch profits, the 
rate is the same as that which would apply under the treaty to dividends paid to a 
foreign corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. corporation). To be entitled to treaty 
benefits for purposes of the branch profits tax, a foreign corporation must meet the 
requirements of the limitations on benefits provision (if any) contained in the treaty, 
and in addition, either the foreign corporation is a qualified resident of the treaty 
country within the meaning of section 884(e)(4) and Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(a), or the 
limitations on benefits provision, or an amendment thereto, entered into force after 
December 31,1986. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(g)(1) (1996). 
37 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1039; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
403; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433-34. 
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(f) elaborates on the determination of effectively 
connected E&P, which is similar to the determination of E&P of domestic 
corporations except that effectively connected taxable income is used in lieu of 
taxable income. Cf I.R.c. § 312. 
39 See I.R.c. § 884(b). 
40 [d. 
41 See I.R.c. § 884(c)(1). 
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produce effectively connected income,42 and U.S. liabilities are 
essentially the liabilities attributed to the U.S. branch for purposes of 
determining the interest expense deduction taken against effectively 
connected income.43 These adjustments for changes in U.S. net equity 
are aimed at measuring indirectly the effectively connected E&P that 
is remitted by the U.S. branch outside of the United States.44 
In examining the branch profits tax for reforms in light of its 
underlying policy, it is also important to consider Congress's 
conceptualization of a U.S. branch that was used in enacting the 
provision.45 The purpose and structure of the branch profits tax 
indicate that Congress viewed a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation 
as a constructive U.S. subsidiary for purposes of imposing a second 
level of U.S. tax on the earnings of the branch.46 The very fact that 
42 See I.R.c. § 884(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d) (1996). See infra notes 101-38 
and accompanying text for details on the definition of U.S. assets. 
43 See I.R.c. § 884(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e) (1996). Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 
uses a three-step process to determine the amount of a foreign corporation's interest 
expense deduction that is allocated and apportioned to effectively connected income. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1996). First, the foreign corporation determines the 
average total value of its U.S. assets (which are generally defined the same as under 
the branch profits tax). Second, the foreign corporation determines the amount of its 
worldwide liabilities that are imputed to its U.S. business ("U.S.-connected 
liabilities") by multiplying its U.S. assets by either (i) its actual worldwide liability-to-
asset ratio or (ii) a fixed ratio, which is ninety-three percent for banks and fifty 
percent for foreign corporations other than banks or insurance companies. Finally, 
the foreign corporation determines interest expense deduction by imputing an 
interest rate to u.S.-connected liabilities using one of two possible methods (the 
adjusted U.S. booked liabilities method or the separate currency pools method). For 
purposes of determining U.S. net equity under the branch profits tax, U.S. liabilities 
are generally defined as the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities (as defined under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5) if U.S.-connected liabilities were determined using the assets 
and liabilities of the foreign corporation as of the close of the particular taxable year 
(rather than the average amount of assets and liabilities for the year). See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.884-1 ( e )(1) (1996). 
44 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1039. 
45 See Steven A. Musher, Coping with the Branch Tax Temporary Regulations: 
Part I, 71 J. TAX'N 110, 115 (1989) (likening a U.S. branch to a "shadow" U.S. 
subsidiary and using this comparison to measure how well the regulations achieve 
parallel treatment of U.S branches and subsidiaries). This analogy, along with the 
underlying policy identified above, will form the basis for the reforms recommended 
in this article. 
46 See Peter H. Blessing, The Branch Tax, 40 TAX LAW. 587, 590 n.23 (1987); 
Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties.' The Branch 
Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173, 176 n.26 
(1989); Fred Feingold & Mark E. Berg, Whither the Branches?, 44 TAX L. REV. 205, 
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Congress enacted the provision in order to reduce the disparity 
between the taxation of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries suggests 
that Congress considered these two forms of conducting a U.S. 
business as equivalents for certain tax purposes. Because the two 
forms are considered equivalents, concerns of tax neutrality call for 
more similar tax treatment with regard to exacting a second level of 
tax on U.S. earnings. The structure of the tax Congress enacted 
supports this reading as well. The determination of a "dividend 
equivalent amount," which imputes the remittance of earnings from 
the U.S. branch, is modeled on the determination of a dividend, which 
similarly tracks the distribution of earnings from a U.S. subsidiary.47 
Indeed, other provisions contained within section 884 expressly 
treat a U.S. branch as a constructive U.S. subsidiary for certain tax 
purposes. Section 884( e )(2) provides that for purposes of applying 
income tax treaties to reduce the rate of the branch profits tax, the 
treaty rate will be that which applies to dividends paid to the foreign 
corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, if the treaty does not 
specify a rate on branch profits.48 In addition, for purposes of sourcing 
interest income, section 884(f)(1)(A) treats interest paid by a U.S. 
branch of a foreign corporation as if it were paid by a U.S. 
corporation.49 Section 884(f)(1)(B) further provides that to the extent 
that a foreign corporation's interest expense deduction under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.882_550 exceeds the interest paid by the U.S. branch, the 
excess interest will be taxable as if the amounts were paid to the 
foreign corporation by a wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary.51 Similar to 
209 (1989). 
47 See Musher, supra note 45, at 110. 
48 As noted earlier, a foreign corporation that is resident of a treaty country 
would need to satisfy certain requirements in order for the treaty to eliminate or 
reduce the foreign corporation's liability under the branch profits tax. See supra note 
36. 
49 1.R.c. § 884(f)(1)(A). Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(b) provides rules for determining 
the interest that is paid by a U.S. branch ("branch interest"). See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-
4(b) (1996). In general, branch interest is defined as interest paid by the foreign 
corporation on its U.S. booked liabilities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(b )(1) (1996). See 
infra note 69 for a description of U.S. booked liabilities. 
50 See supra note 43. 
51 1.R.c. § 884(f)(1)(B). Accordingly, the excess interest generally will be 
subject to a thirty percent tax in the absence of a treaty reduction or exemption. See 
I.R.C. § 881(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(a)(2). Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4 contains specific 
rules for implementing the so-called excess interest tax, including an exemption from 
the tax and its coordination with treaty provisions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(a)(2), 
(c)(3) (1996). With respect to foreign banks, at least eighty-five percent of the bank's 
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the branch profits tax, these interest provisions aim to promote 
neutrality by ensuring that a deduction for interest allowed against the 
U.S. tax base generally gives rise to an interest inclusion subject to 
U.S. tax, which is the case in the context of a U.S. subsidiary.52 
III. THE BRANCH PROFITS TAX VERSUS THE DIVIDEND TAX 
There are obvious differences in the methods used for exacting a 
second level of U.S. tax on remittances of earnings in the U.S. branch 
and subsidiary settings. As described above, the branch profits tax 
employs a formulary approach to determine (and tax) remittances of 
effectively connected E&P by the U.S. branch to other branches of 
the foreign corporation.53 In contrast, the dividend tax applies to 
actual distributions by a U.S. subsidiary to its foreign parent.54 From 
the standpoint of neutrally applying a second-level tax, using different 
methods for the branch and subsidiary settings would not be 
problematic if the substantive results were substantially similar. This, 
however, is not the case. 
A. Imputed Liabilities and the Automatic Nature of the Branch Profits 
Tax 
Under the branch profits tax, a foreign corporation can be subject 
to a second-level tax even when all of its effectively connected E&P is 
invested in U.S. branch assets.55 Thus, unlike the application of the 
excess interest will be treated as deposit interest and exempt from the tax. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.884-4(a)(2)(iii) (1996). Treaties can apply to reduce the rate of taxation to 
the rate applying to interest paid to a foreign corporation by a U.S. corporation, that 
rate typically being zero percent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(c)(3) (1996); see, e.g., 
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 11, para. 1. To be entitled to treaty 
benefits for purposes of the excess interest tax, a foreign corporation must meet the 
requirements of the limitations on benefits provision (if any) contained in the treaty, 
and in addition, either the foreign corporation is a qualified resident of the treaty 
country within the meaning of section 884(e)(4) and Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(a), or the 
limitations on benefits provision, or an amendment thereto, entered into force after 
December 31, 1986. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4(c)(3)(i) (1996). 
52 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1037. 
53 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. 
54 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
5S See Alfred C. Groff & James F. Hoch, Selected Issues in U.S. Taxation of u.s. 
Branches of Foreign Banks, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 343, 363; Brown, supra note 4, at 
196-97; Institute of International Bankers Comments, supra note 16; International 
Commercial Bank of China Comments, supra note 16; Peat Marwick Comments, supra 
note 16. 
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dividend tax in the case of a U.S. subsidiary, a branch profits tax 
liability can occur in the absence of an actual remittance of U.S. 
earnings. This is due to the fact that in determining increases and 
decreases in U.S. net equity for purposes of the tax, U.S. liabilities are 
essentially those that are imputed under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 in the 
determination of the interest expense deduction allocated to 
effectively connected income,56 as opposed to the actual booked 
liabilities of the U.S. branch.57 For example, assume that a foreign 
corporation has $1,000,000 of effectively connected E&P for a 
particular year, and reinvests all of the E&P in U.S. assets.58 There 
are no other changes in the amount of the foreign corporation's U.S 
assets for the year. Assume that the foreign corporation detennines 
its interest expense deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 by using the 
fifty percent fixed liabilities-to-assets ratio to impute liabilities to its 
U.S. branch.59 Under these facts, the foreign corporation would have 
a dividend equivalent amount of $500,000 for the year, which is equal 
to its effectively connected E&P of $1,000,000 reduced by its increase 
in U.S. net equity of $500,000 ($1,000,000 increase in U.S. assets less 
$500,000 increase in U.S. liabilities).60 Consequently, the foreign 
corporation is deemed to have remitted $500,000 of effectively 
connected E&P despite there being no actual remittances.61 
56 See supra note 43. 
57 See Groff & Hoch, supra note 55, at 363; Brown, supra note 4, at 196-97; 
Institute of International Bankers Comments, supra note 16; International Commercial 
Bank of China Comments, supra note 16; Peat Marwick Comments, supra note 16. 
58 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
59 See supra note 43. 
60 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. The increase in U.S. liabilities 
($500,000) would equal the increase in U.S. assets ($1,000,000) multiplied by the fixed 
liability-to-asset ratio (.5). 
61 See Blessing, supra note 46, at 602; Musher, supra note 45, at 113 n.9. While 
the example in the text involves the use of the fixed liability-to-asset ratio, a similar 
result is possible for a foreign corporation using its actual liability-to-asset ratio to 
determine its interest deduction allocated to effectively connected income. For 
example, where, for a particular year, a foreign corporation's U.S. operations are 
relatively more profitable than its foreign operations, and all earnings are retained in 
the branch that earned them, the U.S. branch will draw a greater portion of the 
foreign corporation's liabilities as compared to the prior year using the actual ratio. 
See Peter J. Genz, Planning for Inbound Foreign Investment Under the Final Branch 
Tax Regulations - Part I, 22 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 118, 132 (1993); Musher, supra note 
45, at 112. As a result, where the foreign corporation's total liabilities remained 
unchanged from the prior year, the amount of U.S. liabilities will increase for the 
current year, causing a dividend equivalent amount to this extent even if all 
effectively connected E&P for the year is invested in U.S. assets. 
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These results are inconsistent with the neutrality policy 
underlying the branch profits tax in the sense that a dividend tax 
would not be imposed automatically in the absence of an actual 
distribution by a U.S. subsidiary.62 However, defining U.S. liabilities 
by reference to liabilities imputed under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 is in 
accordance with the policy of neutrality. This is because in both the 
branch and subsidiary settings, U.S. earnings will be subject to a 
second-level tax to the extent that they no longer generate taxable 
income subject to net basis taxation by the United States.63 To explain 
in terms of the previous example, because of interest deductions on 
the additional liabilities of $500,000, only $500,000 of the $1,000,000 in 
effectively connected E&P should be viewed as generating income 
subject to net basis U.S. taxation in subsequent years. The remaining 
$500,000 in effectively connected E&P should be treated as remitted 
outside of the U.S. branch given that this amount effectively is outside 
the scope of such taxation. This is also the case for a U.S. subsidiary 
with $1,000,000 of E&P that first borrowed $500,000 from its foreign 
parent and then distributed $500,000 to the parent, in that only 
$500,000 of earnings would continue to generate income subject to net 
basis U.S. taxation.64 
Of course, there is an important difference in the application of 
the second-level taxes in the branch and subsidiary settings: a foreign 
corporation with a U.S. branch does not have the same ability to 
control the timing of the second-level tax as does a foreign 
corporation with a U.S. subsidiary.65 The latter can avoid a current 
dividend tax on U.S. earnings by having the U.S. subsidiary retain its 
earnings; unlike the treatment of a U.S. branch, liabilities will not be 
62 See Brown, supra note 4, at 196-97; Institute of International Bankers 
Comments, supra note 16. 
63 See Brown, supra note 4, at 197; cf Groff & Hoch, supra note 55, at 363 
(stating that it is arguably not unreasonable to impose a cost where a foreign bank has 
benefited from the fixed ratio in computing its interest deductions). In this regard, 
Congress intended for U.S. net equity to include only those assets and liabilities that 
generate income taxable by the United States on a net basis. See 1986 Bluebook, 
supra note 9, at 1040. 
64 Treasury similarly justifies the use of imputed liabilities on neutrality grounds 
by pointing out that if a U.S. business were conducted in a U.S. subsidiary, the 
subsidiary's assumption of a portion of the foreign parent's liabilities with no resulting 
increase in assets would be treated as a dividend distribution from the subsidiary to 
the parent. See Preamble to Temporary and Proposed Regulations under Section 
884, reprinted in Service Issues Branch Profits Tax Regulations, TAX NOTES TODAY 
(Aug. 30, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 88 TNT 178-2). 
65 See Brown, supra note 4, at 197; Musher, supra note 45, at 112. 
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imputed to earnings retained by a U.S. subsidiary. Moreover, there 
appears to be little possibility that the accumulated earnings tax would 
apply to the retained earnings of the U.S. subsidiary as a surrogate for 
a second-level tax, and the personal holding company tax, even if 
potentially applicable, should still allow for generous accumulations 
without the risk of penalty.66 Thus, the typical U.S. subsidiary 
conducting a business should have a good deal of flexibility in 
avoiding dividend and corporate penalty taxes by retaining earnings in 
either business or nonbusiness assets. In contrast, the branch profits 
tax can apply automatically, regardless of how much effectively 
connected E&P is invested in U.S. branch assets, as the example 
above indicates.67 
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3) does provide some relief from the 
automatic application of the branch profits tax by allowing for an 
election to reduce U.S. liabilities for purposes of both determining 
U.S. net equity under the branch profits tax and calculating the U.S. 
branch's interest deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5.68 Under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3), U.S. liabilities cannot be reduced below 
the amount of U.S. booked liabilities.69 Thus, in the previous 
66 For an explanation of the application of the corporate penalty taxes in the 
subsidiary setting, see infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
67 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
68 A reduction in U.S. liabilities for branch profits tax purposes requires a 
corresponding reduction in U.S.-connected liabilities for purposes of Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.882-5. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(iii) (1996). This in turn can lower a foreign 
corporation's excess interest tax liability. See id; supra notes 50-52 and accompanying 
text. Treasury's stated purpose for providing the election to reduce liabilities is to 
permit a foreign corporation to accumulate earnings in non-U.S. assets for later 
capital investment in the U.S. business. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 C.B. 157, 163. In this 
regard, the liability reduction election replaced the expansion capital election 
contained in the proposed and temporary regulations. See id.; infra note 240. The 
latter was viewed by Treasury as ineffective (because of the possible imputation of 
additional U.S. liabilities on elected assets) and complex (if properly drafted) in 
permitting accumulations of expansion capital in what would otherwise be non-U.S. 
assets. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 c.B. 157, 163. 
69 Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(ii) (1996). Specifically, the floor on reducing U.S. 
liabilities is the amount of U.S. booked liabilities as of the determination date 
(generally the close of the taxable year), increased by the amount of any liabilities 
giving rise to interest expense that is directly allocated to income from a U.S. asset 
under Treas. Reg. § 1.861-lOT, as well as by the amount of certain liabilities of foreign 
insurance companies that are described in Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(2)(i). See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(ii) (1996). U.S. booked liabilities are generally defined as 
liabilities that are treated as properly reflected on the books of the U.S. business 
based on certain standards set forth in the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(2)(i) 
(1996). More specifically, for nonbanks, U.S. booked liabilities include liabilities 
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example, the foreign corporation may be able to reduce its U.S. 
liabilities by $500,000, which would result in a dividend equivalent 
amount of zero for the particular year (effectively connected E&P of 
$1,000,000 reduced by an increase in U.S. net equity of $1,000,000).70 
However, the foreign corporation could only do so if its U.S. liabilities 
prior to the reduction exceeded its U.S. booked liabilities by at least 
the amount of the desired reduction in U.S. liabilities, in this case 
$500,000. In addition, the regulations generally provide that to the 
extent the foreign corporation does not ultimately make investments 
resulting in additional U.S. net equity in an amount equal to the 
earnings accumulating as a result of the election, the foreign 
corporation must recapture that amount as a dividend equivalent 
amount in the year that the U.S. branch is completely terminated.71 
secured by U.S assets of the foreign corporation and liabilities entered on the books 
of the foreign corporation's U.S. business at a time that is reasonably 
contemporaneous with the time that the liability is incurred, among other liabilities. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(2)(ii) (1996). For banks, U.S. booked liabilities include 
liabilities that are timely entered on the books of the foreign corporation's U.S. 
business, provided the liabilities have a direct connection or relationship to the U.S. 
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(2)(iii)(A) (1996). 
70 The liability reduction election is effective only for determining U.S. net 
equity for the taxable year for which the election is made. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-
1(e)(3), (e)(5), ex. 2; Genz, supra note 61, at 133. Therefore, if U.S. assets and U.S. 
liabilities otherwise remain constant, a foreign corporation will have to continue to 
make the election in succeeding years in order to continue to defer the branch profits 
tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(5), ex. 2; Genz, supra note 61, at 133. In addition, 
because of the corresponding reduction in the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities 
and resulting interest deductions, the liability reduction election, while increasing U.S. 
net equity, may also increase effectively connected E&P. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-
1(e)(5), ex. 2. This may necessitate a further reduction in U.S. liabilities to avoid a 
dividend equivalent amount. See id.; Genz, supra note 61, at 133 (explaining that a 
foreign corporation may need to use algebra to determine the amount of the liability 
reduction needed to avoid any dividend equivalent amount). 
71 See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(v) (1996). Technically, recapture occurs 
because of an election to reduce U.s. liabilities for the year preceding the year of the 
complete termination. This assumes that the election contributed to the foreign 
corporation's accumulated effectively connected E&P that existed at the time of the 
complete termination. See id. (upon complete termination of the U.S. branch, the 
branch profits tax is imposed on a dividend equivalent amount equal to the lesser of 
"(i) the foreign corporation's accumulated effectively connected E&P that is 
attributable to the liability reduction election or (ii) the liability reduction that is in 
effect for the taxable year preceding the year of the complete termination"). A 
subsequent increase in U.S. net equity would allow a foreign corporation to 
discontinue its liability reduction election by the amount of the increase, without 
generating a dividend equivalent amount for the particular year. Therefore, a foreign 
corporation can avoid the recapture rule by increasing its investment in U.S. net 
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On the facts of the example given above, this means that the foreign 
corporation would eventually need to increase its U.S. net equity by 
$500,000, the amount of earnings accumulating as a result of the 
liability reduction, in order to avoid recapture. To do so, the foreign 
corporation would have to invest an additional $1,000,000 in U.S. 
assets because of the additional U.S. liabilities that would result from 
additional U.S. assets.72 
With these features, the liability reduction election apparently is 
not very useful to foreign corporations in controlling the timing of 
their branch profits tax liability. With the recapture rule, if the 
taxpayer is not able to make the necessary investments to avoid 
recapture,73 the benefits of reducing liabilities (the delay in the 
imposition of the branch profits tax with a possible reduction in excess 
interest tax liability) may well not outweigh its costs (losing the tax 
benefit attributable to the forgone interest deductions).74 In part for 
equity after making an election to reduce liabilities. It should be pointed out that in 
explaining the recapture rule, Treasury states that recapture will occur if the foreign 
corporation does not ultimately reinvest the accumulated earnings in additional U.S. 
assets, as opposed to additional U.S. equity. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 c.B. 157, 160. This 
statement seems imprecise given the language of the recapture rule, as analyzed 
above. For foreign corporations using the fixed liability-to-asset ratio under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.882-5, investing amounts in additional U.S. assets will not result in additional 
U.S. net equity equal to the invested amounts given that additional U.S. assets will 
create additional U.S. liabilities. The same result can occur with the use of the actual 
liability-to-asset ratio. See supra note 61. 
Aside from the application of the recapture rule, the complete termination of a 
U.S. branch generally does not result in the imposition of the branch profits tax. See 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a) (2006). This is consistent with treating a U.S. branch 
as a hypothetical U.S. subsidiary for purposes of the branch profits tax, given that a 
foreign parent is usually not subject to U.S. tax with respect to distributions received 
upon the liquidation of its U.S. subsidiary. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying 
text. 
72 $1,000,000 in U.S. assets less $500,000 in U.S. liabilities (fifty percent of 
$1,000,000) yields $500,000 in U.S. net equity. See supra note 43 and accompanying 
text. 
73 In this regard, if taxpayers attempted to avoid recapture by investing in U.S. 
assets just prior to a complete termination of the U.S. branch, the Service may be able 
to use its authority under Treas. Reg. 1.884-1(d)(5)(ii) to ignore artificial increases in 
U.S. assets. See Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, Final Branch Regulations Fail to 
Clear the Thicket of Complexity, 78 1. TAX'N 110, 113 (1993). 
74 Delaying the branch profits tax would allow a foreign corporation to invest 
and earn a return on the amount of the deferred taxes. Consequently, the annual 
benefit of delaying the branch profits tax should be equal to the reduction in the 
amount of liabilities (which would translate into reduced dividend equivalent 
amount), multiplied by (1) the rate of the branch profits tax and (2) the foreign 
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this reason/5 the election appears to be worthwhile only In limited 
corporation's after-tax rate of return. In this regard, the rate of the branch profits tax 
is normally thirty percent, but could be five percent or less if the foreign corporation 
is entitled to treaty benefits. See MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 10, 
paras. 2(a), 8, 9. The annual cost of losing the tax benefit attributable to the forgone 
interest deductions should be equal to the reduction in the amount of liabilities, 
multiplied by (1) the interest rate imputed to U.S. liabilities under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.882-5, and by (2) the marginal federal income tax rate that applies to the foreign 
corporation. In addition, the reduction of U.S. liabilities could generate a tax benefit 
by reducing excess interest tax liability by an amount equal to thirty percent of the 
amount of forgone interest deductions; however, in the case of a foreign bank, the 
excess interest tax reduction will be no more than fifteen percent of this amount (see 
supra note 51), and if the foreign corporation is entitled to treaty benefits, there 
would likely be no excess interest tax liability in any event. See id. Assume that the 
foreign corporation's after-tax rate of return equals the interest rate imputed under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, designated as R, the foreign corporation's marginal tax rate is 
thirty-five percent, the rates of the branch profits tax and excess interest tax are thirty 
percent, and the foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities by an amount 
designated as L, which reduces its dividend equivalent amount by the same amount. 
In this situation, the annual benefit of the election would be equal to L x .30 x R (due 
to deferral of branch profits tax) plus L x .30 x R (reduction of excess interest tax) or 
L x .60 x R, which would be greater than the annual cost of the election of L x .35 x R. 
However, if the foreign corporation is a bank, the annual benefit of the election 
would be equal to L x .30 x R (due to deferral of branch profits tax) plus L x .045 x R 
(or less) (reduction of excess interest tax) or Lx .345 x R, which would be slightly less 
than the annual cost of L x .35 x R. If pursuant to a treaty the foreign corporation is 
entitled to a branch profits tax rate of five percent and an excess interest tax rate of 
zero, the annual benefit of the liability reduction election (L x .05 x R) would be 
substantially less than the annual cost (L x .35 x R). Indeed, the latter two situations 
may well be the typical situations where the liability reduction election is available. 
This is because the election can only be used where U.S. liabilities exceed U.S. 
booked liabilities, and foreign corporations other than banks or treaty beneficiaries 
may take steps to increase their U.S. booked liabilities, see supra note 69, to avoid 
excess interest tax exposure. Cf Peter J. Connors, 909-3rd T.M. (BNA), The Branch-
Related Taxes of Section 884 A-51 (pointing out that foreign corporations may seek to 
maximize branch interest and thereby lower excess interest by "overbooking" 
liabilities to the U.S. branch until the amount of the interest deduction is known). 
Nevertheless, commentators do note the use of the liability reduction election to 
reduce excess interest tax exposure, see infra notes 76-77, indicating that foreign 
corporations with such exposure do find themselves in excess U.S. liability situations 
This analysis ignores any foreign and state tax consequences of making the 
election, which could be a factor. Also, it should be emphasized that this costlbenefit 
analysis assumes that the foreign corporation would not be able to make the required 
investments in U.S assets to avoid recapture. 
75 Even without the recapture rule, a foreign corporation may not want to forgo 
interest deductions in exchange for reducing its branch profits tax liability, especially 
if the foreign corporation is entitled to reduced branch profits tax rate and an 
exemption from the excess interest tax pursuant to a treaty. This is similar to a 
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circumstances,76 such as where the U.S. branch is operating at a loss 
for the taxable year,77 or where the foreign corporation has current 
effectively connected E&P but an accumulated deficit.78 Importantly, 
the usefulness of the liability reduction election is curtailed further by 
the U.S. booked liability limit on reducing U.S. liabilities. Indeed, 
because of this limitation, the election very likely would be 
unavailable for a foreign corporation whose liabilities consist entirely 
foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary that chooses to distribute earnings and 
incur a dividend tax rather than having income generated by the invested earnings 
subject to net basis taxation by the United States. Cf Cynthia Blum, How the United 
States Should Tax Foreign Shareholders, 7 VA. TAX REV. 583, 662-66 (1988) 
(discussing the tax tradeoffs facing a U.S. subsidiary in deciding whether to 
accumulate or distribute earnings). 
76 In this regard, one commentator states that the election to reduce liabilities 
will be most useful for purposes of reducing the excess interest tax contained in 
section 884(f). See Kathleen Matthews, Canada-Netherlands Protocol Discussion 
Highlights Annual U.S. IFA Branch Meeting, 93 TAX NOTES INT'L 49-4 (1993) 
(pointing out that for companies operating at a loss, the resulting reduction in 
deductible interest expense will lower their excess interest tax liability while not 
affecting regular income tax liability because of the net loss situation). Another 
commentator states that in the absence of treaty protection from the branch profits 
tax, the election usually makes sense for foreign banks. See Yaron Z. Reich, U.S. 
Federal Income Taxation of u.s. Branches of Foreign Banks: Selected Issues and 
Perspectives, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 1,65 n.159 (1994). Nevertheless, Reich may not be 
taking into account the effect of the recapture rule (at least it is not mentioned in his 
example). 
77 See Paul C. Lau & Rolf Auster, Structuring U.S. Operations for Foreign 
Corporations in the Current Tax Climate, 27 J. CORP. TAX'N 34, 41 (2000); Connors, 
supra note 74, A-15 to -16 (noting that the election may be attractive to a foreign 
corporation with losses that is otherwise facing an excess interest tax liability); Genz, 
supra note 61, at 133. 
78 The liability reduction election should be beneficial in the latter situation 
because the recapture rule provides that the dividend equivalent amount upon the 
complete termination of the U.S. branch will not exceed the accumulated effectively 
connected E&P that is attributable to the election to reduce liabilities. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.884-1(e)(3)(v) (1996). Consequently, if the foreign corporation has a deficit 
in effectively connected E&P when it completely terminates its U.S. branch, there will 
be no recapture of previously reduced liabilities. Alternatively, in these 
circumstances, the taxpayer can discontinue the election for a subsequent year in 
which there is both negative current and accumulated effectively connected E&P, 
without incurring a current branch profits tax in that particular year, or a recapture 
tax upon termination because of the liability reduction limit on recapture. See id. 
Thus, the election also allows a foreign corporation to avoid the tax where it would 
otherwise be imposed in a manner similar to the "nimble dividend" rule of section 
316(a)(2). LR.C. § 316(a)(2). 
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of U.S. booked liabilities.79 More fundamentally, as demonstrated 
below, a U.S. subsidiary would not face the potential for a recapture 
tax following a reduction of its liabilities, nor would it be so limited in 
its ability to reduce liabilities.80 
B. Greater Flexibility of u.s. Subsidiaries in Retaining Earnings 
In addition to the effects of using imputed liabilities in the branch 
setting, a U.S. subsidiary has more control over the timing of the 
dividend tax because of its greater flexibility in retaining earnings than 
does a U.S. branch. The dividend tax in the U.S. subsidiary setting 
only applies when earnings are distributed to the foreign parent.81 
Consequently, a foreign parent of a U.S. subsidiary would avoid a 
dividend tax on any earnings of the subsidiary that are invested in 
assets of the subsidiary, whether or not the assets are related to the 
subsidiary's U.S. business activities; this would include earnings that 
are invested in foreign business assets and portfolio investments.82 
There appears to be little possibility that a U.S. subsidiary would 
be forced to make distributions in order to avoid application of the 
accumulated earnings tax83 for retaining earnings. In most cases, the 
accumulated earning tax apparently cannot apply to a wholly owned 
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, regardless of whether the 
subsidiary accumulates earnings beyond the reasonable needs of its 
business.84 For the accumulated earnings tax to be applicable, Treas. 
Reg. § 1.532-1(a)(1) requires a purpose to avoid the imposition of the 
individual income tax on a corporation's shareholders, or shareholders 
79 See Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 73, at 113; Genz, supra note 61, at 126-27, 
133. For this reason, one commentator describes the liability reduction election as a 
poor replacement for the former expansion capital election, and that a properly-
designed expansion capital election would have been much more useful. Genz, supra 
note 61, at 126, 133. 
80 See infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.C.l. 
81 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
82 See Blum, supra note 75, at 614. 
83 See 1.R.c. §§ 531-537. In general, the accumulated earnings tax imposes a 
fifteen percent tax on a corporation's accumulated taxable income if the corporation 
accumulates earnings for the purpose of avoiding the income tax on its shareholders. 
See 1.R.c. §§ 531, 532. 
84 Section 533(a) presumes that a corporation accumulates earnings for the 
purpose of avoiding the income tax on its shareholders when the corporation 
accumulates earnings beyond the reasonable needs of its business. See 1.R.c. 
§ 533(a). The corporation can rebut the presumption by proving the contrary by the 
preponderance of the evidence. See id. 
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of another corporation, by allowing earnings to accumulate instead of 
distributing them.85 With respect to a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of 
a foreign corporation, this purpose can potentially exist only where 
the foreign parent has individual shareholders who would be subject 
to U.S. tax on dividends paid by the parent.86 With a few minor 
exceptions, a foreign shareholder is not taxable with respect to 
dividends paid by a foreign corporation.87 Consequently, for the 
accumulated earnings tax to apply even potentially in the U.S. 
subsidiary setting, the foreign parent would very likely need to have 
U.S. individual shareholders.88 However, because of the possibility of 
three levels of U.S. tax, U.S. individuals typically would not want to 
85 See Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(a)(1) (1960). 
86 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-034 (Feb. 28, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
94-22-028 (June 3, 1994). 
87 See 1.R.c. § 871(i)(2)(D). Section 871(i)(2)(D), which was added in 2004, 
only provides an exemption from the FDAP/withholding tax for dividends paid by a 
foreign corporation that are treated as U.S. source under section 861(a)(2)(B) (which 
deals with dividends paid by foreign corporations having at least twenty-five percent 
of its gross income being effectively connected gross income over the previous three 
years); therefore, in the absence of a treaty exemption, the withholding tax should 
continue to apply to other situations where dividends paid by foreign corporation are 
treated as U.S. source, that is, dividends paid out of E&P inherited from U.S. 
corporations. See 1.R.c. § 861(a)(2)(C). There is also the possibility that U.S. source 
(or even foreign source) dividends paid by a foreign corporation to a foreign 
individual shareholder could be taxable as effectively connected income; however, 
this is quite unlikely given the limitations on effectively connecting stock, even if the 
foreign individual shareholder has a U.S. business. See infra note 116 and 
accompanying text. See generally I.R.C. § 864(c)(2), (c)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c) 
(2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-6(b )(2)(ii) (1972). 
88 In several private letter rulings, the Service concluded that there was no 
potential for the application of the accumulated earnings tax to a U.S. corporation 
owned by foreign corporations that neither have U.S. shareholders nor U.S. 
businesses. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-09-034 (Feb. 28, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
94-22-028 (June 3, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-30-010 (July 30, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 93-30-011 (July 30, 1993); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-025 (July 17, 1992). 
With the enactment in 2004 of section 871(i)(2)(D), see supra note 87, it is less 
relevant for these purposes whether the foreign corporation has a U.S. business. 
Prior to this exemption, the existence of a U.S. business was quite relevant, as such 
could result in the dividends from the foreign corporation being treated as U.S. source 
and thus taxable in the hands of a foreign individual shareholder under the 
FDAP/withholding tax. With the enactment of section 871(i)(2)(D), whether the 
foreign parent conducts a U.S. business is only relevant for purposes of determining 
the source of the dividends in applying the rules for determining effectively connected 
income; regardless of the source of the dividend income, it is very unlikely that 
dividends would be taxable as effectively connected income in the hands of foreign 
individual shareholders of the foreign parent. See supra note 87. 
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own stock in a privately-held foreign corporation that in turn has a 
U.S. subsidiary.89 A widely-held foreign corporation may well have 
some U.S. individual shareholders, either direct or indirect. However, 
while possible,90 it appears quite unlikely that a subsidiary of a widely-
held parent would be found to be formed or availed of to avoid the 
individual tax on the parent's shareholders.91 This should especially 
be the case for a U.S. subsidiary of a widely-held foreign corporation, 
whose majority of shareholders would presumably be foreign persons 
who rarely would be taxable on dividends paid by the foreign 
corporation.92 It seems very unlikely that such a U.S. subsidiary would 
be found to accumulate earnings in order to avoid the individual tax 
on the foreign parent's U.S. shareholders, where U.S. persons only 
constitute a minority of the parent's shareholders.93 Thus, most U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign corporations would appear to be able to retain 
earnings without the limitations imposed pursuant to the accumulated 
earnings tax. 
89 See Fred B. Brown, Wither FIRPTA?, 57 TAX LAW. 295, 325 (2004); cf Genz, 
supra note 61, at 137 (pointing out that it will often be the case that dividends paid by 
a foreign parent of a U.S. subsidiary to its individual shareholders will not be taxable 
by the United States, thus implying that the shareholders typically will not be U.S. 
persons). 
90 See I.R.C. § 532(c) (stating that accumulated earnings tax is applied without 
regard to the number of shareholders). 
91 Professors Bittker and Eustice point out that although section 532(c) allows 
for the application of the accumulated earnings tax to a publicly-held corporation, the 
conferees recommending this provision removed most of its bite by stating that 
practically "it may be difficult to establish [a tax avoidance] purpose in the case of a 
widely-held operating company when no individual or small group of individuals has 
legal or effective control of the company." See BORIS I. BITIKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7-7 (7th ed. 
2000) (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 829 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3 e.B. 
(Vol. 2) 84); cf Technalysis Corp. v. Commissioner, 101 T.e. 397,410 (1993) (finding 
that the proscribed purpose did not exist despite earnings being accumulated beyond 
reasonable business needs, because the accumulation was not for the direct benefit of 
the shareholders). 
92 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
93 That is, even if the U.S. subsidiary accumulates earnings beyond its 
reasonable business needs and the presumption of the proscribed purpose attaches, 
the subsidiary would appear to be able to demonstrate that its directors did not 
accumulate earnings with the intent to avoid the income tax on a minority of its 
foreign parent's shareholders. Cf Technalysis Corp. 101 T.e. at 410 (examining the 
intent of the board of directors in determining whether a publicly-held corporation 
possessed the proscribed purpose, and finding to the contrary even though the 
corporation accumulated earnings beyond its reasonable business needs). 
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There is also the possibility that a U.S. subsidiary could face 
liability under the personal holding company tax for retaining 
excessive amounts of earnings.94 For the personal holding company 
tax to apply, the U.S. subsidiary must meet a stock ownership test and 
an income test. The stock ownership test would be satisfied if more 
than fifty percent in value of the U.S. subsidiary's stock is owned by 
five or fewer individuals at any time during last half of the taxable 
year.95 For purposes of determining stock ownership, attribution rules 
apply, so that the ownership test is applied to a U.S. subsidiary by 
looking to the ultimate individual owners of the foreign parent.96 The 
income test would be met for a taxable year if at least sixty percent of 
the corporation's adjusted ordinary gross income consists of personal 
holding company income, which is generally investment income 
(including dividends, interest, certain royalties, and certain rents ).97 
Because of the large proportion of investment income that is 
necessary to trigger the application of the tax, significant 
accumulations in the case of an operating company should be possible 
without the risk of penalty, even if the U.S. subsidiary cannot avoid 
satisfying the stock ownership test.98 
As a result of these rules, a typical U.S. subsidiary would appear 
to be able to accumulate a generous amount of earnings in 
nonbusiness assets and avoid both the dividend tax and the corporate 
penalty taxes for retaining earnings. On the other hand, a foreign 
corporation with a U.S. branch can avoid a branch profits tax on its 
U.S. branch earnings only to the extent that its U.S. net equity is 
increased.99 Apart from the liability reduction election/oo this would 
94 See 1.R.c. §§ 541-547. Section 541 imposes a fifteen percent tax on the 
undistributed personal holding company income of a personal holding company (as 
defined in section 542). See I.R.C. § 541. Several types of corporations are excluded 
from the application of the personal holding company tax, including foreign 
corporations and banks. See 1.R.c. § 542(c). 
95 See 1.R.c. § 542(a)(2). 
% See 1.R.c. § 544(a). 
97 See 1.R.c. §§ 542(a)(1), 543(b)(2), 543(a). 
98 Cf BITIKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 7-61 (suggesting an increase in the 
number of shareholders coupled with an avoidance of the stock attribution rules to 
avoid the personal holding company tax). However, corporations that meet the 
closely held test are cautioned to monitor their accumulation of earnings in 
investment assets. See Genz, supra note 61, at 138. 
99 See supra notes 3~3 and accompanying text. This assumes that the foreign 
corporation is not exempt from the application of section 884 by virtue of an income 
tax treaty. See supra note 36. 
100 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
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require that the foreign corporation invest its U.S. earnings in U.S. 
assets, that is, assets that generally produce effectively connected 
income.101 This usually means that the assets must bear some 
connection to the business conducted by the U.S. branch. 102 More 
specifically, U.S. assets include assets employed in U.S. business 
operations, such as real estate,I03 depreciable or amortizable personal 
104 • 105 . d . U S I h . property, mventory, mcome-pro ucmg ., rea property t at IS 
elected for effectively connected treatment,l06 as well as financial 
assets (such as bank deposits and marketable securities) that produce 
effectively connected income. I07 
101 See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d) (1996). The regulations generally define U.S. 
assets as property held by the foreign corporation on the determination date 
(generally the close of taxable year), if all of the property's income and gain on that 
date is effectively connected income, or would be effectively connected if the property 
produced income and gain on that date. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(1)(i) (1996). In 
addition, the regulations employ effectively connected income rules and concepts to 
specify categories of property that qualify as U.S. assets regardless of the general rule. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2) -(4) (1996). 
102 See generally 1.R.c. § 864(c); infra notes 103-38 and accompanying text. See 
also Mark Alan Masek, United States Business: United States Branch Versus United 
States Corporation, 23 INT'L LAW. 137 (1989). 
103 U.S. real estate used in U.S. business operations should qualify as a U.S. asset 
under the general rule contained in Treas. Reg. 1.884-1(d)(1)(i). See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.884-1(d)(2)(xi), ex. 2 (1996). 
104 All or a portion of depreciable or amortizable personal property used in U.S. 
business operations should qualify as a U.S. asset under a specific category rule. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(i) (1996). 
105 All or a portion of inventory used in U.S. business operations should qualify 
as a U.S. asset under a specific category rule. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(ii) 
(1996). 
106 Where a foreign corporation has made an election under section 882(d) to 
treat income from U.S. real property as effectively connected, the property should 
qualify as a U.S. asset under the general rule contained in Treas. Reg. 1.884-
l(d)(l)(i). Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(xi), ex. 3 (1996) (where a foreign 
corporation had not made an election under section 882(d), U.S. real property not 
connected to a U.S. business did not qualify as a U.S. asset). 
107 Specifically, financial assets would qualify as U.S. assets under the general 
rule if they meet the effectively connected income and gain standard contained 
therein. See supra note 101. In addition, certain categories of financial assets can 
qualify as U.S. assets under the specific category rules. An interest-bearing deposit 
with a bank or similar entity (e.g., savings and loans) would qualify as a U.S. asset if 
all of the income from the deposit during the year is effectively connected; a 
noninterest bearing deposit would qualify as a U.S. asset if the deposit is needed in 
the U.S. business under the asset-use test without regard to the presumption rule. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(v) (1996); infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. A 
debt instrument not covered under any other specific rule, such as a marketable 
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For U.S. source income from financial assets I08 to be effectively 
connected, either (i) the activities of the U.S. branch must be a 
material factor in the realization of the income,109 in the case of 
income arising directly from U.S. branch activities,110 or (ii) the 
financial assets are used or held for use in the conduct of the U.S. 
branch's business,lIl in the case of income arising indirectly from U.S. 
branch activities.1I2 The latter standard (referred to in the regulations 
as the "asset-use test") is satisfied if the asset is (a) "held for the 
principal purpose of promoting the present conduct" of the U.S. 
branch's business, (b) "acquired and held in the ordinary course of the 
[U.S.] trade or business," or (c) "otherwise held in a direct 
relationship" to that business.1l3 In determining whether an asset is 
held in a direct relationship to the U.S. business, a principal factor is 
whether the asset is needed in that business, which requires that the 
asset be held to meet the present needs of the U.S. business and not 
its anticipated future needs.114 In addition, an asset will be presumed 
to be held in a direct relationship to the U.S. business if (i) the asset 
was acquired with funds generated by that business, (ii) the income 
security held by a nonbank, would qualify as a U.S. asset if (i) all of the income from 
the instrument for the taxable year is effectively connected and (ii) the yield on the 
instrument while it is held during the taxable year equals or exceeds the Applicable 
Federal Rate for obligations of similar type and maturity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-
1( d)(2)(vi) (1996). Certain investment securities held by banks are treated as U.S. 
assets in proportion to the amount of their income that is treated as effectively 
connected for the taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(vii) (1996); infra note 
120 and accompanying text. 
108 Specifically, this refers to assets generating U.S. source FDAP income (e.g., 
interest, dividends, rents and royalties) and capital gains. See I.R.C. §§ 864(c)(2), 
871(a)(I), (h), 881(a), (c). 
109 See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(2)(B). 
110 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(3), (c)(5) (2005). The regulations implementing 
this standard contain the business-activities test and the special banking rules. See id. 
III See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(2)(A). In making the determinations under section 
864(c)(2), due regard is given to whether or not the asset or income is carried on 
books of account kept for the U.S. business. See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(2); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.864-4( c)( 4) (2005) (accounting test is not by itself controlling). 
112 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2) (2005). Foreign source FDAP income 
generally cannot be effectively connected. See 1.R.c. § 864(c)(4). One exception is 
where a U.S. banking branch derives interest or dividends on stocks or securities with 
respect to which the U.S. branch satisfies certain participation standards, among other 
requirements. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(B)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-6(b)(2)(ii)(b) (1972); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5) (2005). 
113 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(ii) (2005). 
114 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(a) (2005). 
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from the asset is reinvested or retained in that business, and (iii) U.S. 
branch personnel significantly manage and control the investment of 
the asset. IIS Generally, dividends and gain on stock cannot be 
effectively connected income under the asset-use test. 116 
Special rules apply to determine the effectively connected status 
of interest, dividends, and capital gains from securities or stocks 
derived by U.S. banking branches of foreign persons. ll7 Such banking 
income generally will be effectively connected if the U.S. banking 
branch actively and materially participated in soliciting, negotiating, 
or performing other activities necessary to arrange the acquisition of 
the security or stock.1I8 However, under these special banking rules, 
notwithstanding such participation, it would appear that income from 
stock usually cannot be effectively connected,1I9 and income on certain 
investment securities cannot be effectively connected to the extent 
that the aggregate of such securities exceeds ten percent of the assets 
of the U.S. branch.120 
115 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(b) (2005). 
116 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(a) (2005). An exception applies for stock 
held by a foreign insurance company, unless the foreign insurance company owns ten 
percent or more of the vote or value of the stock in the particular corporation. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(b) (2005). 
117 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5) (2005). 
118 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii), (iii) (2005). 
119 This is a result of the requirement that stock be acquired (i) as a result of, or 
in the course of, making loans to the public, which excludes purchases on exchanges 
or over-the-counter markets, (ii) in the course of distributing stocks or securities to 
the public, or (iii) to satisfy reserve requirements established by banking authorities in 
the United States. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii), (iv)(c) (2005). Compare Treas. 
Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(vii), ex. 2 (2005) (dividends and gain on stock treated as not 
effectively connected where stock purchased on exchange and not acquired to meet 
reserve requirements) with Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(vii), ex. 3 (2005) (dividends 
and gain on stock treated as effectively connected where stock received as 
consideration for making a loan). 
120 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii) (2005). Specifically, securities that are 
covered by this rule are securities other than the following: (i) securities acquired (a) 
as a result of, or in the course of, making loans to the public, which excludes 
purchases on exchanges or over-the-counter markets, (b) in the course of distributing 
stocks or securities to the public, or (c) to satisfy reserve requirements established by 
banking authorities in the United States, or (ii) securities that (a) are payable on 
demand or at a fixed date one year or less from the acquisition date, or (b) issued by 
the United States government. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii)(b)(3) (2005). An 
example of a security that would typically fall within this investment securities 
limitation would be a corporate bond, with a maturity date more than a year after the 
acquisition date, which is acquired on an exchange or organized over-the-counter 
market. 
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As a result of the rules for defining U.S. assets, a U.S. branch 
could be subject to a second-level tax where it invests its earnings in 
assets unrelated to its U.S. business, even though there would be no 
dividend tax (or likely corporate penalty taxes) in a similar situation 
involving a U.S. subsidiary.l2l For example, the dividend tax obviously 
would not apply where a U.S. subsidiary, conducting a U.S. business 
that sells inventory, invests its earnings in U.S. corporate bonds, and 
neither the accumulated earnings tax nor the personal holding 
company tax would typically apply as well. l22 In contrast, a foreign 
corporation with a U.S. sales branch may well face a branch profits tax 
liability in this situation (apart from the imputation of U.S. liabilities 
on additional U.S. assets123). For the branch profits tax not to apply, 
the U.S. corporate bonds would need to qualify as U.S. assets, which, 
in turn, would require that interest on the bonds constitute effectively 
connected income. l24 Because the business activities of the U.S. 
branch do not give rise directly to the realization of the interest, the 
asset-use test should be used to determine the effectively connected 
status of the income. l25 Under this test, the interest income would be 
effectively connected if the bonds were held to meet the present needs 
of the U.S. business, such as if the bonds constituted a temporary 
investment of working capital.126 On the other hand, the bonds 
ordinarily would not satisfy the asset-use test if they were held for 
future diversification into a new business, expansion of non-U.S. 
business activities, future business contingencies, or future plant 
127 replacement. 
121 See Masek, supra note 102, at 144--45; cf Musher, supra note 45, at 112-13 
(pointing out that, under the assumption that the accumulated earnings tax would be 
potentially applicable to a comparable U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch apparently 
could not accumulate earnings in assets held for anticipated future business needs and 
avoid the branch profits tax, whereas a similarly situated subsidiary could do so and 
avoid the dividend tax as well as the accumulated earnings tax). 
122 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. This assumes that the interest on 
the bonds equals or exceeds the Applicable Federal Rate for debt instruments with 
similar terms. See id. 
125 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text. In this regard, the regulations 
provide that the asset-use test is of primary significance where U.S. source interest 
income is derived by a foreign corporation that is engaged in the business of selling 
goods or manufacturing in the United States. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(i) 
(2005). 
126 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(a), (c)(2)(v), ex. 1 (2005). 
127 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iv)(a) (2005). 
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Nevertheless, the interest on the bonds may be effectively 
connected under the rule that presumes a direct relationship between 
the asset and the U.S business, if the interest is reinvested or retained 
in the U.S. business and U.S. branch personnel significantly manage 
and control the investment in the bonds.128 In this regard, it is not 
clear what constitutes reinvesting or retaining income in the U.S. 
business; while using the funds in the business activity of the U.S. 
branch should qualify,129 retaining funds in an account or investment 
maintained by U.S. branch personnel may not. l30 Perhaps more 
significant is the uncertainty concerning the effect of the presumption. 
The regulations indicate that the taxpayer can overcome the 
presumption of a direct relationship by showing that the asset was 
held for future purposes relating to the U.S. business.131 It is unclear 
whether the Internal Revenue Service (Service) likewise can 
overcome the presumption by demonstrating such a purpose, and 
whether a party attempting to rebut the presumption needs to satisfy a 
higher than normal burden in order to prevail.132 It may be that the 
presumption merely shifts to the party opposed to effectively 
connected treatment the burden of showing that the asset was not held 
to meet the present needs of the U.S. business. If so, even if the 
presumption applies in the case of the bonds, the Service could still 
prevail in treating the bonds as non-U.S. assets by showing that they 
are held for purposes unrelated to the present needs of the U.S. 
128 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The third requirement for the 
application of the presumption, that the asset was acquired with funds generated by 
the u.s. business, is satisfied under the assumed facts. See supra text accompanying 
note 122-23. 
129 This should include using income from the asset as working capital for the 
U.S. business, or to acquire property for use or sale in the U.S. business. 
130 An example in the regulations applying the presumption simply states that 
income from an asset is retained in the U.S. business without elaborating on the 
details. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(v), ex. 2 (2005). Providing more detail, the 
House technical explanation of section 864(c)(2) states that the "significance to be 
attached to the disposition of the income [from an asset] will depend on the amount 
of such income and its relation to other activities of the U.S. business." See H.R. REP. 
No. 1450, 89TH CONG., 20 SESS., at 59 (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 967, 1008. This 
statement indicates that simply retaining the income in an account maintained by the 
U.S. branch may not be sufficient to satisfy the presumption. 
131 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(v), ex. 2 (2005). 
132 The regulations are silent in this regard. The proposed regulations under this 
section required a "clear showing" that the asset was not held to meet the present 
needs of the U.S. business in order to rebut the presumption. See Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1030, 1032 (Jan. 23, 1969). 
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business. 133 
If the example above involved a U.S. branch engaged in banking, 
neither the asset-use test (with its presumption rule) nor the business 
activities test134 would govern the effectively connected status of the 
interest on the bonds. Instead, the special banking rules would apply, 
and under these rules, the bonds generally would qualify as U.S. assets 
(because the interest income would be effectively connected) if the 
U.S. branch actively and materially participated in the acquisition of 
the bonds.13s However, assuming that the bonds were purchased on 
exchanges (or organized over-the-counter markets) and had terms in 
excess of one year from the date of acquisition, the bonds likely would 
not qualify as U.S. assets to the extent that the aggregate of the bonds 
and similar securities held by the U.S. branch exceed ten percent of 
the assets of the U.S. branch.136 As a result of the investment 
securities limitation, a U.S. banking branch would not have the same 
flexibility in retaining earnings as would a U.S. banking subsidiary, 
which could retain an unlimited amount of earnings in debt 
instruments of any type, including long-term corporate bonds and 
municipal government bonds (subject to possible constraints under 
the accumulated earnings tax137). Nevertheless, a U.S. banking branch 
would appear to have a good deal of flexibility, given that it can retain 
earnings in U.S. government obligations and corporate bonds with 
maturity dates of one year or less from acquisition, without limitation 
under the investment securities rule.138 In addition, a U.S. banking 
branch could retain earnings in other investment securities up to the 
133 On the other hand, the Service appears to indicate in a field service advice 
that it cannot rebut the presumption, characterizing the presumption rule as a safe 
harbor, which, if met by the taxpayer, will satisfy the direct relationship standard 
without a showing of actual need. See 1996 FSA LEXIS 273 (Jan. 30, 1996). The field 
service advice does not expressly discuss whether or not the Service could rebut a 
determination of direct relationship pursuant to the presumption rule. The legislative 
history of section 864(c), which gave rise to the presumption rule, does not appear to 
resolve the uncertainty. See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 130, at 1008 ("Generally, 
the presence of [the three presumption] factors is to be determinative of the assets 
being used in the business without showing that the income or assets are needed in 
the U.S. business."). 
134 See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. 
136 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
137 In this regard, the accumulated earnings tax likely would not be even 
potentially applicable to most U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. See supra 
notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 120. 
2006] Reforming the Branch Profits Tax 1247 
ten percent limit. 
Even if foreign corporations with U.S. branches can use the asset-
use test and the special banking rules to retain earnings in assets that 
are held for some investment or future business purposes, an 
important difference still exists between the branch and subsidiary 
settings: unlike a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch 
would lack certainty that the earnings will be treated as retained. 
While a U.S. subsidiary can retain earnings with near-certainty of 
avoiding a second-level tax simply by investing the earnings in assets 
owned by the subsidiary (with possible constraints under the personal 
holding company139 and accumulated earnings taxes140), a U.S. branch 
would need to satisfy the fact-specific standards under the effectively 
connected tests in order to increase (or maintain) its amount of U.S. 
assets.141 Consequently, a foreign corporation may inadvertently 
trigger a branch profits tax liability by making investments that do not 
qualify as U.S. assets,142 whereas a U.S. subsidiary should be able to 
control the imposition of second-level taxes with relative ease (subject 
to any constraints imposed by the corporate penalty taxes).143 This 
difference may well add administrative costs to a U.S. branch, which 
must take the time and effort to ensure that it satisfies the proper 
standards to avoid a second-level tax. l44 
139 See supra note 94-98 and accompanying text. 
140 See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text. Even with the apparent 
flexibility that U.S. banking branches have in retaining earnings, they still need to 
ensure that acquisitions of securities and stocks satisfy the active and material 
participation standard in order to have the assets qualify as U.S. assets. See supra 
notes 117-20 and accompanying text. In this regard, the Service has indicated that it 
will closely scrutinize situations where a foreign bank makes a loan to a related party. 
See Rev. Rul. 86-154, 1986-2 C.B. 103, 104 (situation 2). It is also possible for certain 
lending activities by a U.S. branch to give rise to securities subject to the investment 
securities limitation. For example, where a U.S. branch participates in a syndicated 
loan that is managed by another bank, if the U.S. branch acquires its participation 
interest after the initial funding of the loan, the interest would apparently fall within 
the investment securities limitation. See Reich, supra note 76, at 11-12. It is even 
possible for a related party loan involving material participation by the U.S. branch to 
be treated as a security not acquired in the course of making loans to the public, and 
therefore subject to the investment securities limitation. See id. at 12 n.25. 
142 See Genz, supra note 61, at 135. 
143 See id. 
144 Cf William H. Newton III, Structuring Foreign Investment in United States 
Real Estate, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 517,524-25 (1996) (pointing out that avoiding the 
branch profits tax requires continuous monitoring of U.S. assets and liabilities, 
whereas avoiding the dividend tax only requires not making distributions). 
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C. Resulting Differences in the Imposition of Second-Level Taxes 
Importantly, the ability on the part of a U.S. subsidiary to control 
the timing of the second-level tax goes beyond determining when the 
tax applies;145 it can also affect whether a second-level tax is imposed. 
The repatriation of earnings upon the liquidation of a U.S. subsidiary 
of a foreign corporation is generally free of U.S. tax to the foreign 
parent.146 Moreover, as discussed above, a U.S. subsidiary typically 
145 Of course, timing in itself can be important in light of the time value of 
money. 
146 It appears that section 332 generally would provide tax-free treatment to a 
foreign parent upon the liquidation of its U.S. subsidiary. Under section 332, a parent 
corporation generally will not recognize gain or loss upon the receipt of property in 
the complete liquidation of its subsidiary corporation provided that the parent owns 
at least eighty percent of the stock of the subsidiary (by vote and value) and the 
liquidation meets certain timing requirements. See I.R.c. § 332(a), (b). Section 
367(a) generally provides that section 332 will not apply to the liquidation by a U.S. 
subsidiary into a foreign corporation. See I.R.c. § 367(a)(1). However, regulations 
under section 367(e)(2) make section 367(a) inapplicable to these outbound section 
332 liquidations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(e)-2(a)(2) (2003); I.R.c. § 367(a)(6) 
(providing Treasury with the authority to exclude certain transfers from the 
application of section 367(a)(1». Despite this clear statement of section 367(a)'s 
nonapplicability to outbound section 332 liquidations, there may be some question as 
to whether this statement applies for purposes of the foreign parent's tax treatment, 
given that the section 367(e) regulations are directed at the tax treatment of the 
liquidating subsidiary. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.367(e)-2(a)(1) (2003) (describing the 
purpose and scope of the section 367(e)(2) regulations). In the case of an outbound 
section 332 liquidation of a U.S. real property holding corporation (as defined in 
section 897( c )(2», regulations under section 897( e) provide that the foreign parent 
will not recognize any gain under section 367(a) (or section 897(e». See Temp. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.897-5T(b)(3)(iv)(A) (2003). Even if nonrecognition treatment would be 
unavailable under section 332 because of section 367(a), it is very likely that the 
foreign parent would still not be subject to tax on the recognized gain under sections 
881 or 882. This is because the stock gains would not be FDAP income and therefore 
not subject to tax under section 881(a). See I.R.c. § 331(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-
2(b)(1), (2) (2000). And, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c), the stock gains would 
very likely not be effectively connected income and therefore not taxable under 
section 882(a). See supra note 116. 
As an exception to this tax-free treatment, pursuant to recently added section 
332(d), the liquidation of certain domestic holding companies can result in deemed 
dividends, which would generally be taxable to the foreign parent under section 
881(a). More specifically, section 332(d) treats the liquidation of a U.S. corporation, 
substantially all of whose assets consist of stock of affiliated subsidiaries (under 
section 1504(a», as a section 301 distribution to the foreign parent, if the liquidating 
U.S. corporation had been in existence for less than five years. As a result, the 
distribution would be treated as a dividend to the extent of the U.S. holding 
company's E&P, see I.R.c. §§ 301(c), 316(a), and thus subject to the thirty percent 
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would not be subject to the corporate penalty taxes for retaining 
earnings.147 As a result, earnings retained by a U.S. subsidiary may 
never be subject to a second-level tax. The complete termination of a 
foreign corporation's U.S. branch generally is also tax_free,148 in order 
to mirror the tax treatment of a liquidating U.S. subsidiary.149 
gross basis tax in the absence of treaty rate reduction. See 1.R.c. § 881(a). Congress 
enacted the provision out of a concern that foreign corporations would establish a 
U.S. holding corporation to receive tax-free dividends from U.S. operating 
companies, liquidate the U.S. holding company to distribute the U.S. earnings without 
a dividend tax, and then reestablish another U.S. holding company. See S. REP. No. 
108-192, at 166 (2003). Thus, the provision limits the ability of foreign corporations 
with U.S. subsidiaries to avoid a dividend tax on U.S. earnings that are removed from 
the scope of net basis U.S. taxation prior to the cessation of U.S. operations. In this 
regard, see infra note 157-60 and accompanying text. The rules governing the 
complete termination of a foreign corporation's U.S. branch contain a similar 
restriction, in that the exemption from the branch profits tax for the year of 
termination is lost if, within three years after the termination, the foreign corporation 
has effectively connected income (with some exceptions) or the U.S. assets of the 
terminated branch (or property attributable to such U.S. assets or to effectively 
connected E&P of the termination year) are used by the foreign corporation or a 
related corporation in a U.S. business. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(2) (1996); 
infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text; cf S. REP. No. 108-192, at 165-66 (2003) 
(referring to this branch termination rule in describing the present law in connection 
with proposal to add section 332(d». 
While the liquidation of a U.S. subsidiary generally is tax-free to the foreign 
parent, the U.S. subsidiary would generally be required to recognize any gain realized 
on the transaction. See infra note 149. 
147 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
148 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(1) (1996). A foreign corporation 
generally is not subject to the branch profits tax for the year in which it completely 
terminates its U.S. business activities. See id. The recapture tax is an exception to 
this complete termination rule. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. In general, 
a foreign corporation is treated as having completely terminated all of its U.S. 
business activities if (i) the foreign corporation has no U.S. assets; (ii) for the next 
three years, the foreign corporation has no effectively connected income (with some 
exceptions), and the U.S. assets of the terminated branch (as well as property 
attributable to such U.S. assets or to effectively connected E&P of the termination 
year) are not used by the foreign corporation or a related corporation in a U.S. 
business; and (iii) the foreign corporation satisfies certain procedural requirements. 
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(2) (1996). 
149 See Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 223-26. Upon the liquidation of a U.S. 
subsidiary into its foreign parent, the subsidiary generally would be required to 
recognize realized gains (and permitted to recognize realized losses, subject to 
limitations) with respect to its assets that are distributed in the liquidation. See I.R.C. 
§§ 337(a), 367(e); Treas. Reg. § l.367(e)-2(b)(1) (2003). An exception applies where 
distributed U.S. business assets continue to be used in a U.S. business by the foreign 
parent for the next ten years. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(e)-2(b)(2)(i) (2003). However, 
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However, because a U.S. branch is less able to accumulate earnings/50 
and may be subject to the recapture rule with respect to a portion of 
its accumulated earnings,151 it is likely that less U.S. earnings will 
escape a second-level tax upon termination of a U.S. branch than 
upon liquidation of a U.S. subsidiary. Thus, the substantive 
differences between the branch profits tax and the dividend tax 
appear to be significant. 
In part because the branch profits tax is more onerous than the 
dividend tax, commentators generally recommend that foreign 
corporations avoid conducting U.S. businesses in branch form and 
instead use U.S. subsidiaries.152 Thus, while the branch profits tax was 
this exception would not be available in circumstances that are analogous to a foreign 
corporation's complete termination of its U.S. branch, because a U.S. business would 
no longer exist. Consequently, the liquidation of a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary 
would be a taxable event to the subsidiary. On the complete termination of a U.S. 
branch, a foreign corporation may well be disposing of its U.S. assets and thereby 
recognizing gains and losses on these assets. This is because the foreign corporation is 
required to have no U.S. assets in order to terminate completely its U.S. business. See 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a)(2)(i)(A) (1996). However, it is also possible for a 
foreign corporation to convert a U.S. asset into a non-U.S asset by repositioning the 
asset in a foreign business, although there are some limits on doing so as a result of 
sections 864(c)(6) and 864(c)(7). See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text 
(discussion of U.S. assets); I.R.c. §§ 864(c)(6) (effectively connected status of 
deferred income is determined based on the underlying transaction), 864(c)(7) 
(property formerly used in a U.S. business and disposed of within ten years after 
cessation of such use will be treated as so used at the time of the disposition); cf 
I.R.S. Priv. Let. Rul. 96-11-042 (Dec. 14, 1995) (regardless of whether foreign 
corporation continues to be engaged in a U.S. business, outstanding loans still 
constitute U.S. assets because interest income on the loans is effectively connected 
under section 864(c)(6) and any gain realized would be effectively connected under 
section 864(c)(7)). Even so, any gain on the disposition of a former U.S. asset 
apparently would be treated as effectively connected income if the asset is disposed of 
within ten years after its use in the U.S. business. See I.R.c. § 864(c)(7); see, e.g., 
I.R.S. Priv. Let. Rul. 200-018-027 (Feb. 1, 2000). Nevertheless, to bring about more 
similar treatment in the U.S. branch and subsidiary settings upon the termination of a 
U.S. business, consideration should be given to requiring a foreign corporation to 
recognize gains (and losses, with possible limits) where it converts U.S. assets to non-
U.S. assets in the absence of a disposition. 
150 See supra Parts lILA and III.B. 
151 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
152 See Robert F. Hudson, Jr., Current Techniques for Foreign Investment in U.S. 
Real Estate - Income and Estate Tax Considerations, 22 TAX NOTES INT'L 3027,3028, 
3039 (2001); Hirschfeld & Grossman, supra note 18, at 38-39; Blessing, supra note 46, 
at 638 (listing other tax factors as well that favor the use of a U.S. subsidiary, 
including lack of statutory treating-shopping restrictions, ability to file consolidated 
returns, foreign corporate records being less relevant, and state income and franchise 
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aimed at reducing the disparity between the taxation of foreign 
corporations' U.S. branch and subsidiary operations by subjecting 
branch earnings to a second-level tax, as implemented the tax goes too 
far in this direction and thereby appears to discourage the use of 
branches. I53 The next Part explores certain measures for making the 
branch profits tax more like the dividend tax to effectuate Congress's 
desire for branch/subsidiary neutrality in imposing second-level taxes. 
tax allocation formulas); Aaron A. Rubinstein & Angela W.Y. Yu, The Benefits and 
Burdens of the Final Branch Level Taxes Regulations, INT'L TAX J., Spring 1994, 58, 
58-60 (branch profits tax regulations do not provide parity for U.S. subsidiaries and 
U.S. branches because the control of timing that exists for subsidiaries is lost for 
branches); cf Genz, supra note 61, at 135-36 (pointing out that while there is no 
"cookie-cutter" analysis for determining whether to use a U.S. subsidiary or U.S. 
branch to conduct a U.S. business, the following factors have tended to create a 
preference for using a U.S. subsidiary: complexity of the branch tax rules, the 
difficulty in establishing qualified residency for claiming treaty benefits under the 
branch tax rules, the expense of compliance, and the fact that it is relatively easy for a 
U.S. subsidiary to control distributions (subject to corporate penalty tax constraints) 
whereas constructive remittances under the branch profits tax can occur quite 
unexpectedly); Lau & Auster, supra note 77, at 60-61 (noting that among other 
considerations, the complexity and burden of the branch level taxes have played a 
role in the traditional use of U.S. subsidiaries by foreign corporations doing business 
in the United States, but pointing out that with recent developments such as the 
check-the-box regulations, a single member LLC treated as a branch may provide 
greater tax benefits because of the ability to offset income in the foreign corporation's 
home country). An exception may exist where the foreign corporation has treaty 
protection against the branch profits tax. See Blessing, supra note 46, at 638. Another 
tax reason for preferring U.S. subsidiaries over U.S. branches may be the intricacies 
of the branch profits tax; avoiding the tax requires continuous monitoring of a foreign 
corporation's U.S. assets and liabilities, whereas avoiding the dividend tax merely 
requires refraining from making distributions. See Newton, supra note 144, at 524-25. 
The lack of guidance for attributing profits to branches for purposes of applying 
income tax treaties may also create a disincentive for using the branch structure. See 
Sprague, supra note 18, at 973. 
153 See Blessing, supra note 46, at 647 (concluding that the principal effect of the 
branch taxes appears to be that future U.S. operations generally will be conducted 
through U.S. subsidiaries, and that while Congress intended to achieve neutrality, the 
provision may discourage the use of branches by foreign corporations); Masek, supra 
note 102, at 145-46; cf Groff & Hoch, supra note 55, at 368 (concluding that while the 
branch profits tax achieves parity with the taxation of U.S. subsidiaries in some 
respects, it may favor the use of U.S. subsidiaries by foreign banks in other respects). 
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IV. MODIFYING THE BRANCH PROFITS TAX TO MAKE IT MORE 
EQUIVALENT TO THE DIVIDEND TAX 
A. Overview 
As explained below, with certain modifications the branch profits 
tax would do a better job of effectuating Congress's intent to reduce 
the disparity in the taxation of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries. 
Specifically, this Part suggests and examines two changes to the 
liability reduction election for making the branch profits tax more 
equivalent to the application of dividend tax in the subsidiary setting: 
(i) eliminating the potential for recapture upon the termination of a 
U.S. branch where a foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. 
liabilities, and (ii) removing the U.S. booked liability limitation under 
the election to reduce U.S. liabilities. This Part also examines a third, 
arguably more radical measure for bridging the gap between the 
branch profits and dividend taxes - providing foreign corporations 
with an election to treat investment assets generating U.S. source 
income as effectively connected assets - as well as a variation on this 
measure that is contingent on changes to the application of the 
accumulated earnings tax in the subsidiary setting.1s4 
The neutrality policy underlying the branch profits tax supports 
these measures for making the branch profits tax more equivalent to 
the dividend tax in the subsidiary setting. 155 With the corporate 
penalty taxes typically allowing for generous accumulations,ls6 a 
foreign corporation using a U.S. subsidiary to conduct a U.S. business 
generally can avoid a second-level tax on the subsidiary's earnings by 
having the subsidiary invest the earnings in assets that it holds, or 
effectively doing the same by using the earnings to pay down its 
liabilities. Because the income generated by invested earnings will be 
subject to net basis taxation by the United States/57 there will be a tax 
154 Some commentators have intimated an even more radical idea, in questioning 
whether it is sound policy to subject any U.S. source income to gross basis taxation in 
situations where a foreign person has U.S. business properties from which to collect 
taxes. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 251 (2001). While this may be 
something to consider, this article proposes a more limited measure to advance 
neutrality in the application of second-level taxes. See infra Part IV.D. 
155 See infra Parts IV.B.l, IV.C.l, IV.D.l, and IV.E.2. 
156 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
157 This is also effectively the case where earnings are used to pay down liabilities 
of the U.S. subsidiary, due to the resulting loss of interest deductions that would have 
been taken against the U.S. tax base. 
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cost to deferring or eliminating (if earnings are retained until 
liquidation '58) the second-level tax.
159 
Consequently, a foreign 
corporation using a U.S. subsidiary to conduct a U.S. business usually 
has a choice of whether to incur a second-level tax or instead have the 
income on invested earnings continue to be taxed by the United States 
on a net basis. As explained in detail below, the measures proposed in 
this article allow for a similar result in the branch setting, and thus 
promote neutrality in the application of the branch profits and 
dividend taxes. 160 
Besides the branch profits tax, concerns of branch/subsidiary 
neutrality are evident in several other features of international 
taxation, such as the deemed paid creditl61 and the look-through rules 
under the foreign tax credit mechanism.162 Furthermore, eliminating 
disparities in the taxation of branches and subsidiaries is consistent 
with certain principles embodied in tax treaties. Treaty 
nondiscrimination articles generally require that a treaty country shall 
not tax a permanent establishment of a nonresident enterprise less 
favorably than a resident enterprise carrying on the same activities. '63 
While many treaties now specifically exempt the U.S. branch profits 
tax from the ban on discriminatory taxes,l64 this appears to be 
predicated on Congress's view that the branch profits tax treats 
foreign corporations with U.S. branches no worse than the dividend 
tax treats foreign corporations with U.S. subsidiaries. '65 As explained 
158 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
159 See Blum, supra note 75, at 614-15. 
160 Cf id. (stating that the branch profits tax imposes a second-level U.S. tax 
when U.S. branch earnings are reinvested outside the scope of net basis U.S. taxation, 
and that this makes the tax treatment of a U.S. branch closer to that of a U.S. 
subsidiary). Indeed, the tax treatment of the invested earnings appears to be the only 
relevant and sensible determinant in comparing distributions within a legal entity (the 
branch setting) to distributions between legal entities (the subsidiary setting). In fact, 
Congress appears to have recognized this, given that it intended for U.S. net equity 
under the branch profits tax to include only those assets and liabilities that generate 
income taxable by the United States on a net basis. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, 
at 1040. 
161 See 1.R.c. § 902. 
162 See 1.R.c. § 904(d). 
163 See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 24, para. 2. 
164 See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at art. 24, para. 5. 
165 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1038; S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
402; H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, supra note 12, at 433 (calling for Treasury to renegotiate 
outstanding treaties to permit the application of the branch profits tax). 
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above, however, this is not the case.166 Indeed, the American Law 
Institute rejected an approach for implementing a branch remittance 
tax that would deem all branch earnings to have been remitted 
regardless of actual remittances, because of the concern that 
automatically subjecting a branch to an additional tax burden, when 
compared to a similarly-situated U.S. corporation, may well violate 
treaty nondiscrimination clauses.167 Consequently, the principles, if 
not the current requirements, of treaty nondiscrimination articles also 
support measures for equalizing the application of second-level taxes 
with respect to branches and subsidiaries. 
The measures suggested by this article, however, raise issues of 
potential conflicts with other policies governing the taxation of U.S. 
branches. In particular, as explained below, measures for eliminating 
substantive differences in the application of the branch profits tax and 
dividend tax may be at odds with the fungibility principle underlying 
the rules for imputing interest deductions to U.S. branch operations, 
as well as the policies supporting the effectively connected income 
rules. l68 There may also be the concern that these measures effectively 
repeal the branch profits tax or at least drastically minimize its 
effect. 169 However, an examination of these potential conflicts 
suggests that the measures are consistent with recognized policies 
governing the taxation of foreign corporations with U.S. branches. 
B. Eliminating the Recapture Rule Contained in the Election to 
Reduce U.S. Liabilities 
1. Promoting Neutrality 
The branch profits tax can be made more similar to a dividend tax 
by amending the liability reduction election so as to eliminate the 
resulting tax that can occur upon the termination of the U.S. branch. 
This measure would result in more neutral treatment of U.S. branches 
and U.S. subsidiaries, in that a reduction of U.S. liabilities under the 
election is analogous to a U.S. subsidiary's transfer of funds to its 
foreign parent to pay down inter-corporate debt, and funds used for 
this purpose will not be subject to a second-level U.S. tax upon the 
liquidation of the subsidiary. 
166 See supra Part III. 
167 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 1~5. 
168 See infra Parts IV.B.2 and IV.D.2.a. 
169 See infra notes 191-94, 253-59, 318-19 and accompanying text. 
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As discussed earlier, the regulations allow for an election to 
reduce U.S. liabilities for purposes of both determining U.S. net 
equity under the branch profits tax and calculating the U.S. branch's 
interest deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, subject to the 
limitation that U.S. liabilities may not be reduced below the amount 
of U.S. booked liabilities.170 However, the regulations generally 
provide that to the extent the foreign corporation does not ultimately 
make investments resulting in additional U.S. net equity in an amount 
equal to the earnings accumulating as a result of the election, the 
foreign corporation must recapture that amount as a dividend 
equivalent amount in the year that the U.S. branch is completely 
terminated. l7l 
As indicated in the preamble to the final branch profits tax 
regulations, the election to reduce liabilities was intended to permit a 
foreign corporation to accumulate earnings in non-U.S. assets for later 
capital investment in the U.S. business.172 Even though the earnings 
are invested in non-U.S. assets, the earnings are shielded from the 
branch profits tax by the additional U.S. net equity resulting from the 
reduction in U.S. liabilities, at least until the termination of the U.S. 
branch. Consequently, the election essentially provides a foreign 
corporation with more time to make investments in U.S. assets in 
order to avoid the imposition of the branch profits tax.173 While the 
accumulated earnings do not directly generate income subject to net 
basis U.S. tax (because they are not invested in U.S. assets), the loss of 
interest deductions resulting from reduced U.S. liabilities appears to 
be a surrogate for imposing U.S. tax on the income from these 
assets.174 
170 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra note 71-72 and accompanying text. 
172 See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 c.B. 157, 159. In this regard, the liability reduction 
election replaced the expansion capital election contained in the proposed and 
temporary regulations, the latter being viewed by Treasury as ineffective and complex 
(if properly drafted) in permitting accumulations of expansion capital in what would 
otherwise be non-U.S. assets. See id. 
173 See Lau & Auster, supra note 77, at 41 n.13 (noting that the election to reduce 
liabilities effectively defers the branch profits tax). The liability reduction election 
can also result in a permanent elimination of the branch profits tax even where 
amounts are not ultimately invested in additional U.S. assets, if the election is made 
for a year in which there is positive current ECEP, but negative accumulated ECEP. 
See supra note 78. 
174 Cf Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 73, at 113 n.13 (referring to the loss of 
interest deductions under the liability reduction election as comparable to the cost of 
the former expansion capital election, which required the investment yield on elected 
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Thus, the liability reduction election can produce an effect similar 
to the accumulation of earnings by a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation, in that earnings can effectively be retained without the 
current imposition of a second level of U.S. tax. However, there are 
important differences in the functioning of this feature of the branch 
profits tax and a subsidiary's accumulation of earnings. A U.S. 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation avoids a dividend tax on its 
retained earnings, whether or not accumulated for business needs, and 
a second-level tax generally will not apply upon the liquidation of the 
subsidiary even if the earnings are never devoted to business needs. 175 
Moreover, there appears to be little possibility that the accumulated 
earnings tax would apply on the retained earnings of the U.S. 
subsidiary as a surrogate for a second-level tax, and the personal 
holding company tax, even if potentially applicable, typically should 
still allow for generous accumulations without the risk of penalty.176 
On the other hand, the branch profits tax is generally imposed upon 
the termination of the U.S. branch if the accumulated earnings are not 
ultimately invested in U.S. assets, that is, assets that produce 
effectively connected income, which generally means that to 
permanently avoid the branch profits tax, the accumulated earnings 
ultimately must be invested in assets that bear some connection to the 
business conducted by the U.S. branch.177 Moreover, additional U.S. 
assets are likely to give rise to additional U.S. liabilities;178 
consequently, a foreign corporation would probably need to increase 
its investment in U.S. assets by an amount that is considerably greater 
than the earnings accumulated pursuant to the liability reduction 
election in order to avoid a branch profits tax upon termination of the 
U.S. branch.179 As a result, these features make the imposition of the 
branch profits tax more likely than the imposition of second-level 
taxes in the subsidiary setting.180 
securities to be included as effectively connected income). The cost of reducing 
liabilities may be offset to an extent by a resulting reduction in excess interest tax 
liability. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
[75 See supra notes 81-82,146 and accompanying text. 
[76 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
[77 See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text. See supra note 78 and 
accompanying text for a situation where the tax can be avoided even without a 
subsequent investment in U.S. assets. 
[78 See supra notes 43, 56-60 and accompanying text. 
[79 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
[SO It is not clear whether Treasury was aware of this difference when drafting the 
regulations. Treasury included the recapture rule out of concern that repeated 
liability reduction elections could result in substantial deferral of branch profits tax 
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There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the current 
liability reduction election in light of the neutrality policy underlying 
the branch profits tax. The recapture rule contained in the provision 
results in dissimilar treatment for foreign corporations with U.S. 
branches versus those with U.S. subsidiaries because a reduction of 
U.S. liabilities under the election is analogous to a U.S. subsidiary's 
transfer of funds to its foreign parent to pay down inter-corporate 
debt, and funds used for this purpose will not be subject to a second-
level U.S. tax upon the liquidation of the subsidiary. 
The amount of liabilities subject to reduction in the U.S. branch 
setting, i.e., the excess of U.S. liabilities over U.S. booked liabilities, is 
analogous to d~bt owed by a U.S. subsidiary to its foreign parent.18l 
Thus, where a foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities 
to eliminate or reduce a dividend equivalent amount, the appropriate 
analogy in the U.S. subsidiary setting is the subsidiary's use of funds to 
satisfy liabilities owed to its foreign parent. Upon a pay down of 
inter-corporate liabilities in the subsidiary setting, funds earned by the 
liability, as well as its elimination upon the complete termination of the U.S. branch 
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T(a). See Genz, supra note 61, at 134. Thus, 
Treasury concluded that accumulated earnings resulting from reductions in U.S. 
liabilities ultimately had to be invested in U.S. assets, or else the branch profits tax 
would eventually be imposed on the accumulated earnings. Perhaps Treasury was 
under the impression that the accumulated earnings tax would be potentially 
applicable in all cases involving U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations; what is 
apparently the first in a series of private letter rulings taking the opposite view was 
issued the same year that the final regulations were promulgated, although the 
regulation that the ruling applied had been issued in 1959. See T.D. 6377, 1959-1 c.s. 
125; supra note 88 and accompanying text. Or perhaps Treasury thought that with the 
possible reduction in excess interest tax liability, the loss of interest deductions 
pursuant to the election was not a sufficient surrogate for taxing the income generated 
by the accumulated earnings. However, the foreign corporations that are in a position 
to use the election may well have a minimal reduction in excess interest tax liability as 
a result of the election. See supra note 74. It is possible that Treasury felt compelled 
by the statute and legislative history to give the branch profits tax some real "teeth," 
despite the resulting differences when compared to the application of second-level 
taxes in the subsidiary setting. However, the statute and legislative history give 
Treasury latitude in defining U.S. assets and U.S. liabilities, provided these definitions 
are consistent with those used to determine assets and liabilities that give rise to 
effectively connected taxable income. See I.R.C. § 884(c)(2); 1986 Bluebook, supra 
note 9, at 1040. And by crafting the recapture rule, Treasury is not taking into 
account the policy of branch/subsidiary neutrality that underlies the branch profits 
tax. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of a more 
fundamental problem with the recapture rule. 
181 This is the conceptualization for the branch level tax on excess interest 
contained in section 884(f)(1)(B). See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
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u.s. subsidiary can be invested in assets whose income will not be 
subject to U.S. net basis taxation, yet without a dividend tax on the 
transferred amounts. IS2 Similarly, in the branch setting, the liability 
reduction election allows funds earned through U.S. branch 
operations to be invested in noneffectively connected assets, free of a 
current branch profits tax. And in both settings, the events result in 
fewer liabilities for determining interest deductions taken against the 
U.S. tax base. To this extent neutrality is achieved - a U.S. branch 
has the same opportunity as a U.S. subsidiary to shift funds outside of 
the United States without incurring a current second-level tax, by 
reducing the amount of liabilities that are taken into account for U.S. 
tax purposes. 
However, unlike what occurs under the branch profits tax because 
of the recapture rule, funds earned by the U.S. subsidiary that are 
used to pay down inter-corporate debt will not be subject to a second 
level of U.S. tax upon the liquidation of the subsidiary.ls3 There is no 
182 Upon the repayment of a loan made by a foreign parent to its U.S. subsidiary, 
the parent would not have any gross income, assuming the payment equaled the 
parent's adjusted basis in the debt instrument. See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1271(a). 
Consequently, there generally should be no FDAP income for purposes of section 
881(a) on the repayment of the loan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.l441-2(b)(1) (2000) (noting 
that FDAP income requires that there be gross income). Nevertheless, there is the 
possibility that debt could be reclassified as stock for tax purposes if, for example, the 
U.S. subsidiary is thinly capitalized. See generally BIITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, 
at 4-41 to -53. If that were to occur, the repayment of the debt would be treated as a 
redemption of stock that would be taxable to the foreign parent as a dividend (to the 
extent of the subsidiary's E&P). See 1.R.c. §§ 302(b), (d), 301(c), 316(a), 881(a); 
BIITKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 4-57 (pointing out that the repayment of a 
purported loan that is reclassified as equity would be treated as a stock redemption, 
with the substantial risk of being taxed as a dividend). It should be noted that there is 
also the potential for debt/equity reclassification in the case of a foreign corporation 
with a U.S. branch. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, the Service has the ability to 
reclassify a foreign corporation's purported debt as equity for purposes of 
determining the foreign corporation's actual liability-to-asset ratio, which is used to 
impute liabilities to the U.S branch (if the foreign corporation elects to use its actual 
ratio). See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(c)(2)(ii), (c)(5), ex. 1 (1996); supra note 43. If 
reclassification were to occur in the branch setting, U.S. liabilities would be reduced. 
To bring about similar consequences for U.S. branches and subsidiaries upon 
reclassification, consideration should be given to disregarding an elective reduction of 
U.S. liabilities to the extent that U.S. liabilities have been reduced as a result of 
debt/equity reclassification. With this approach, reclassification in the branch setting 
could produce a dividend equivalent amount, which would be analogous to the 
dividend consequences upon reclassification in the subsidiary setting. 
183 Moreover, even though the pay down of inter-corporate liabilities would not 
reduce E&P, the earnings represented by the transferred funds would never be 
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recapture of these amounts as a dividend upon liquidation, regardless 
of whether there are subsequent infusions of assets into the subsidiary. 
For example, assume that a foreign corporation initially capitalizes its 
wholly owned U.S. subsidiary with $1,000,000 of assets, taking back 
$500,000 of stock and $500,000 of debt. In its first year of operations, 
the subsidiary has $500,000 of earnings and profits and uses these 
funds to payoff the $500,000 liability owed to its foreign parent. l84 
The next year the U.S. subsidiary liquidates. The liquidating 
distribution of assets should be tax-free to the foreign parent.185 
In comparison, assume that a foreign corporation establishes a 
U.S. branch by investing $1,000,000 in effectively connected assets, 
with $500,000 of liabilities imputed to the U.S. branch pursuant to 
Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5. In its first year of operations, the U.S. branch 
has $500,000 of effectively connected E&P. The foreign corporation 
does not invest any of its U.S. earnings in effectively connected assets, 
but elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities to zero, resulting in a dividend 
equivalent amount of zero for the year. l86 The next year the foreign 
corporation completely terminates the U.S. branch. While generally 
tax-free/87 the complete termination of the U.S. branch in this case 
results in a $500,000 dividend equivalent amount under the recapture 
rule, given that the foreign corporation had elected to reduce its U.S. 
liabilities and did not (prior to the year of the complete termination) 
increase its investment in U.S. net equity by an amount equal to the 
effectively connected E&P that accumulated as a result of the liability 
subject to a dividend tax provided that subsequent nonliquidating distributions by the 
subsidiary do not exceed subsequent E&P. Furthermore, there appears to be little 
possibility that the subsidiary would be subject to the corporate penalty taxes on these 
earnings. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. Even in the atypical case 
where the accumulated earnings tax would be potentially applicable, the tax should 
not apply if, after paying down inter-corporate liabilities, the subsidiary's remaining 
assets consist of operating assets and other assets held for the reasonable needs of its 
business (which should be the case where the funds originally borrowed from the 
foreign parent were used for this purpose). Cf infra note 312. Under these facts, the 
personal holding company tax also is not likely to apply. Cf supra notes 94-98 and 
accompanying text. 
184 The repayment of the loan generally should be tax-free to the foreign parent. 
See supra note 182. 
185 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
186 In light of the U.S. booked liability limitation on reducing liabilities, it is 
assumed that the foreign corporation has U.S. booked liabilities of zero, thereby 
allowing U.S. liabilities to be reduced to zero. 
187 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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reduction election. ISS 
While there are certainly legal differences between the reduction 
of liabilities imputed to a U.S. branch for tax purposes and a U.S. 
subsidiary's pay down of liabilities owed to its foreign parent, the 
branch profits tax is concerned purely with the tax consequences of 
transactions as opposed to their legal consequences. For example, a 
remittance of funds within a single foreign corporation should have no 
legal consequences, yet this transaction can clearly result in branch 
profits tax liability for the particular year.189 Thus, in evaluating the 
branch profits tax in terms of neutrality, it is appropriate to consider 
the tax consequences of the reduction of liabilities in the branch and 
subsidiary settings despite the legal differences involved. This analysis 
indicates that eliminating the recapture rule would promote tax 
neutrality in the application of second-level taxes with regard to U.S. 
branches and U.S. subsidiaries. l90 
It may be contended that without the recapture rule, foreign 
corporations would often make the election to reduce their U.S. 
liabilities/91 resulting in lower dividend equivalent amounts with no 
188 See supra note 71. 
189 See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text. 
190 Besides the recapture tax in the branch setting, another difference in the two 
situations analyzed above is that the foreign corporation would likely include the 
amount by which it reduced its U.S. liabilities as part of its U.S.-connected liabilities 
for purposes of determining its interest deduction for the year of complete 
termination. This is because the election to reduce U.S. liabilities is done annually 
(see supra note 70), and the foreign corporation would have no need to reduce its U.S. 
liabilities for the year of complete termination given that the branch profits tax would 
not apply for this year (aside from the recapture rule), see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-
2T(a)(1) (2006), unless it did so to reduce its excess interest tax exposure for that 
year. In contrast, a U.S. subsidiary would not receive interest deductions for the year 
of liquidation on the amount by which it reduced its liabilities. Consequently, so that 
U.S. branches do not receive an advantage over U.S. subsidiaries in this regard, with 
the elimination of the recapture rule, I recommend that the amount of U.S.-connected 
liabilities for the year of complete termination be reduced by the amount of the 
liability reduction for the previous year, regardless of whether the election is 
continued for the year of complete termination. 
In commenting on the temporary and proposed branch profits tax regulations, 
commentators have similarly proposed allowing foreign corporations to reduce the 
amount of liabilities imputed to U.S. branches (and without any mention of the need 
for a recapture rule upon termination of the U.S. branch), in order to promote 
neutrality for U.S. branches and subsidiaries. See Peat Marwick Comments, supra 
note 16 (proposing that liabilities not be imputed to investment assets that are elected 
to be treated as effectively connected assets); Institute of International Bankers 
Comments, supra note 16. 
191 However, even without the recapture rule, there may be reasons why foreign 
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restoration of these amounts upon the termination of the U.S. branch. 
Thus, the elimination of the recapture rule may significantly reduce 
the amount of tax imposed under Code section 884(a). However, 
there are limits on a foreign corporation's ability to lower its annual 
dividend equivalent amount by reducing U.S. liabilities, given the U.S. 
booked liability limitation.192 Consequently, significant exposure to 
the section 884(a) tax is possible even with a liability reduction 
election that can permanently eliminate a portion of the branch 
profits tax liability. More importantly, the election to reduce U.S. 
liabilities would carry with it a cost - the loss of interest deductions 
for purposes of determining effectively connected taxable income.193 
Consequently, the branch profits tax would continue to affect, albeit 
indirectly, the U.S. tax liability of foreign corporations' U.S. branch 
operations, and to the same extent that the dividend tax affects 
similarly situated U.S. subsidiaries. That is, for both U.S. branches 
and U.S. subsidiaries, second-level taxes can be avoided only at the 
cost of having the income generated by the invested earnings subject 
to net basis taxation by the United States, which is effectively the case 
with the loss of interest deductions.194 
2. Potential Conflict with the Policies Supporting the Fungibility 
Approach for Imputing Liabilities 
While advancing neutrality, the elimination of the recapture rule 
may violate the policies supporting the fungibility approach for 
imputing liabilities to U.S. branches. However, while this measure 
would allow a foreign corporation to reduce the liability-to-asset ratio 
of its U.S. branch below that of the foreign corporation as a whole (or, 
alternatively, below a fixed ratio )/95 a ceiling on a U.S. branch's 
corporations would refrain from electing to reduce liabilities. See supra note 75. 
192 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
193 This is mitigated to a degree by the possible reduction in excess interest tax 
liability. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
194 In terms of the previous examples, the $500,000 of U.S. earnings will 
effectively generate income subject to U.S. net basis taxation. That is, prior to the 
realization of these earnings, there was $500,000 of net assets ($1,000,000 of assets less 
$500,000 of liabilities) generating taxable income subject to u.S. tax. After the 
realization of the earnings and reduction of liabilities, there are $1,000,000 of net 
assets ($1,000,000 of assets less $0 liabilities) generating taxable income subject to 
u.S. tax. 
195 As mentioned previously and amplified below, with the recapture rule, the 
current liability reduction election really represents a deferred imposition of the 
branch profits tax rather than an actual deviation from the fungibility approach. See 
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liability-to-asset ratio would remain, thus continuing to address the 
thin capitalization concerns underlying the fungibility approach. 
As discussed previously, Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, which implements 
the fungibility approach for determining interest deductions, imputes 
liabilities to the U.S. branch in an amount equal to the amount of U.S. 
assets multiplied by either the foreign corporation's actual worldwide 
liability-to-asset ratio or a fixed ratio. l96 By giving a foreign 
corporation the flexibility to reduce its U.S. branch liability-to-asset 
ratio below the prescribed ratio, the suggested measure arguably 
conflicts with the fungibility approach governing the amount of capital 
allocated to U.S. branches. Of course, given that the current election 
permits a foreign corporation to reduce its U.S.-connected liabilities 
below the amount calculated under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5, the 
elimination of the recapture component of the current election may 
be viewed as resulting in no greater deviation from the fungibility 
concept. However, because of the potential for recapture, the election 
to reduce liabilities effectively results in the delayed remittance of 
U.S. earnings that are not ultimately invested in U.S. assets, as 
opposed to a decrease in the liability-to-asset ratio of U.S. branch.197 
The resulting loss of interest deductions apparently represents a 
surrogate for imposing U.S. tax on the income from the investment in 
non-U.S. assets.198 Without recapture, however, we understand the 
foreign corporation to be using funds earned through U.S. branch 
operations to satisfy constructive inter-branch liabilities, thereby 
running counter to the fungibility approach for allocating liabilities 
and capital to U.S. branches of foreign corporations. 
While an election to reduce liabilities without the recapture rule 
arguably offends the fungibility concept, it does not violate what 
appears to be the key policy underlying fungibility: ensuring that a 
U.S. branch has an adequate amount of capital for tax purposes. In 
establishing the fungibility approach for allocating interest deductions, 
it appears that Treasury was mainly concerned with the ability of 
taxpayers to manipulate the tax results under a booking approach for 
determining branch liabilities. 199 For example, under a booking 
supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text; infra notes 197-98 and accompanying 
text. 
196 See supra note 43. 
197 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
199 cf Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(a) (2004) (stating that the "fungibility approach 
recognizes that all activities and property require funds and that management has a 
great deal of flexibility as to the source and use of funds"); 1986 Bluebook, supra note 
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approach, a taxpayer would be able to allocate interest deductions to 
effectively connected income, and thus reduce the U.S. tax base, 
simply by having liabilities booked at the U.S. branch. Thus, the 
fungibility approach was apparently aimed at addressing the concern 
of having an excessive amount of liabilities and interest expense 
allocated to U.S. activities.2°O Similarly, under the separate entity 
approach for taxing branch operations, which is supported by the 
OEeD as well as authorized under some U.S. tax treaties,201 the 
concern is whether the branch has too little capital, not too much.202 
That the real concern is preventing excessive amounts of liabilities is 
further borne out by the fact that Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 uses a 
modified fungibility approach which permits a foreign corporation, for 
administrative reasons, to use a fixed liability-to-asset ratio.203 The use 
9, at 944 (describing how taxpayers could use a strict separate company method to 
allocate interest expense against foreign source income by adjusting the location of 
borrowing within an affiliated group). 
200 Cf Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 120 (1999) 
(stating the government's position that the fungibility approach contained in Treas. 
Reg. § 1.882-5 serves as a simple yet effective means of allocating capital to U.S. 
branches and preventing manipulation to shift income for tax avoidance purposes); 
I.R.S. Notice 2005-53, 2005-32 IRB 263, 263 (Aug. 8,2005) (stating that Treasury and 
the Service continue to believe that Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 results in a sufficient 
allocation of equity capital to a permanent establishment while addressing the effect 
of the recent treaties with the United Kingdom and Japan on its application). 
201 See Convention Between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of Japan For the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, art. 7, 
Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY DOc. No. 108-14 (2003); Convention Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland For the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and 
on Capital Gains, U.S.-UK., art. 7, July 24, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-19 (2002). 
202 See US. Treasury Releases Technical Explanation of Japan-U.S. Tax Treaty, 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Feb. 25, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 
2004 WTD 39-11) (part 1 of 2) (pointing out "that a permanent establishment cannot 
be funded entirely by debt, but must have sufficient capital to carryon its activities" 
in the course of explaining Article 7, paragraph 3, as interpreted by diplomatic notes); 
U.S. Treasury Department Releases Technical Explanation of Proposed UK.-US. 
Income Tax Treaty and Protocol, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Mar. 5,2003) (LEXIS, 
FEDT AX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2003 WTD 45-27) (part 1 of 2) (same); Molly Moses, 
IRS Official Responds to Comments on OECD Paper for PE Profit Attribution, 2004 
BNA DAILY TAX REP. No. 89, at G-4 (May 10, 2004) (stating that the basic concept 
underlying the GECD method of allocating capital is that the permanent 
establishment should have sufficient capital to support its functions and risks). See 
generally Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 491 (2003). 
203 See supra note 43. 
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of the fixed ratio by electing foreign corporations offends pure 
fungibility, given that the liability ratio of the U.S. branch will deviate 
from that of the entire corporation.204 However, as with the use of the 
fixed liability ratio, elimination of the recapture rule would still result 
in a cap on the liabilities attributed to the U.S. branch. Consequently, 
providing foreign corporations with the flexibility to increase the 
capital of their U.S. branches for tax purposes is not inconsistent with 
the central policy underlying the fungibility approach.205 
C. Removing the U.S. Booked Liability Limitation Under the 
Election to Reduce U.S. Liabilities 
1. Promoting Neutrality 
Tax neutrality between U.S. branches and subsidiaries would be 
advanced by permitting a foreign corporation to lower its dividend 
equivalent amount by reducing its U.S. liabilities below the amount of 
U.S. booked liabilities. This is because such a further reduction in 
U.S. liabilities is analogous to a foreign parent's assumption of third 
party liabilities of its U.S. subsidiary in connection with the transfer of 
funds by the subsidiary to the parent. This type of transaction is not 
subject to a dividend tax. 
As discussed earlier, in allowing for the liability reduction 
election, the regulations prohibit a foreign corporation from reducing 
its U.S. liabilities below the amount of U.S. booked liabilities.206 Even 
with the liability reduction election as a way of permitting the 
accumulation of earnings for later capital investment in the U.S. 
204 Alternatively, the use of the fixed ratio may indicate that Treasury views the 
administrative benefits of avoiding the calculation (and verification) of an actual 
liability-to-asset ratio as outweighing any benefits derived from using a pure 
fungibility of liabilities approach. The same can be said about the neutrality benefits 
of eliminating the recapture rule. 
205 As far as another potential policy conflict, it may be pointed out that lessening 
the impact of the branch profits tax may substantially benefit foreign financial 
institutions and insurance companies, who, unlike other foreign corporations, often 
prefer to structure their U.S. operations as branches for nontax reasons. See John 0. 
Hatab, u.s. Taxation of Foreign Banking in the United States - An Overview, 41 
N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 27.01[1], at 27-2 (1983); Rubinstein & Yu, supra 
note 152, at 58-59; Henry J. Birnkrant et aI., Prop. Reg. 1.882-5 Overhauls Interest 
Allocation for u.s. Branches, 3 J. INT'L TAX'N 166, 166 (1992). However, there is no 
indication that Congress enacted the branch profits tax in order to exact a heavier tax 
toll on foreign corporations engaged in banking or insurance businesses, as compared 
to other foreign-controlled U.S. businesses. 
206 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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business, there is not an obvious need for imposing such a limit on 
reducing liabilities.207 While a greater amount of earnings could be 
temporarily invested in non-U.S. assets without a current branch 
profits tax liability in the absence of such a limit, there would also be 
increased costs, as reducing U.S. liabilities below the amount of U.S. 
booked liabilities would result in a greater loss of interest deductions 
for U.S. tax purposes. Perhaps Treasury felt that for purposes of 
determining interest deductions, U.S. booked liabilities "belong" to 
the U.S. branch to a greater extent than the excess of U.S liabilities 
over U.S. booked liabilities, and that therefore a foreign corporation 
should not be permitted to reduce U.S. liabilities below this amount.208 
However, the key determinant in computing a foreign corporation's 
interest deductions is the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities, not 
U.S. booked liabilities. While the interest rate on U.S. booked 
liabilities is used to impute interest expense to U.S.-connected 
liabilities (to the extent of U.S. booked liabilities) under the adjusted 
U.S. booked liabilities method,209 the regulations effectively remove a 
portion of U.S. booked liabilities from the computation to the extent 
that U.S.-connected liabilities are less than U.S. booked liabilities. 
This removal is performed by mUltiplying the interest expense on U.S. 
booked liabilities by the ratio of U.S.-connected liabilities to U.S. 
booked liabilities.210 Consequently, U.S. booked liabilities should not 
207 In this regard, the preamble to the final regulations adopting the liability 
reduction election is silent as to the reasons for the U.S. booked liability limitation. 
See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 C.B. 157. 
208 This view may be indicated by the fact that the floor for reducing U.S. 
liabilities also includes liabilities that are directly allocable to U.S. assets under Temp. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-10T, which, like U.S. booked liabilities, appear to bear a stronger 
connection to the operations of the U.S. branches as compared to other liabilities of 
the foreign corporation. See supra note 69; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-lOT (1988). 
209 This is the effect of the adjusted U.S. booked liability method. When U.S.-
connected liabilities exceed U.S. booked liabilities, the interest deduction allocable to 
effectively connected income is the total of the interest paid or accrued by the U.S. 
branch on U.S. booked liabilities, plus the excess of U.S.-connected liabilities over 
U.S. booked liabilities multiplied by the foreign corporation's interest rate on U.S.-
dollar liabilities that are booked outside the United States; when U.S. booked 
liabilities exceed U.S.-connected liabilities, the interest deduction allocable to 
effectively connected income is the interest paid or accrued by the U.S. branch on 
U.S. booked liabilities, multiplied by the ratio of U.S.-connected liabilities to U.S. 
booked liabilities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(d)(4), (d)(5) (1996). See generally supra 
note 43. 
210 See supra note 209. Moreover, the amount of U.S. booked liabilities is not 
relevant under the current separate currency pools method. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-
5( e) (1996). It should be noted that the previous version of the separate currency 
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be viewed as sacred for purposes of the interest expense 
determination.211 Alternatively, the liability reduction limit may 
simply have been intended as a lower cap (as compared to the amount 
of U.S. liabilities) on the ability to accumulate earnings for later 
capital investment in U.S. assets. The Treasury may have felt that 
such a limit, although not mandated by the theory underlying the 
election, was appropriate given that the statute does not appear to call 
for any flexibility in the timing of the tax.212 
In any event, the limit on the liability reduction election runs 
counter to the neutrality concerns underlying the branch profits tax, in 
that it results in disparate tax treatment for similarly-situated U.S. 
branches and subsidiaries. The limit on the election applies in the 
situation where the amount of U.S. booked liabilities equals or 
exceeds the amount of U.S. liabilities. Where U.S. booked liabilities 
exceed U.S. liabilities, a foreign corporation can be regarded as having 
borrowed amounts in the United States to fund activities of its foreign 
branches.213 This situation is analogous to a U.S. subsidiary with no 
borrowings from its foreign parent and with total liabilities that are 
less than the combined third-party U.S. booked liabilities of the 
parent and the subsidiary. In other words, in this situation a portion 
of the third-party U.S. booked liabilities is considered a liability of the 
foreign parent rather than of the U.S. subsidiary. Where U.S. booked 
pools method, which was in effect when Treasury promulgated the branch profits tax 
regulations, did use the denominations of U.S. booked liabilities in determining the 
currency pools to which the method applied. See former Treas. Reg. § 1.882-
5(b )(3)(ii) (1981). 
211 Another possible reason for the U.S. booked liability limitation is that 
Treasury may have conceptualized the liability reduction election as if the branch, as 
a hypothetical U.S. subsidiary, were paying down liabilities owed to its foreign parent, 
and that this construct only applies to the excess of U.S. liabilities over U.S. booked 
liabilities. This is the concept that I have advanced for the current liability reduction 
election. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text. Such a construct, however, 
is inconsistent with the recapture rule. See supra notes 183-90 and accompanying 
text. Thus, it appears that, as stated in the preamble to the final regulations, Treasury 
crafted the liability reduction election as a means of permitting a foreign corporation 
to accumulate expansion capital, as opposed to implementing a construct that 
involves the pay down of inter-corporate liabilities. In any event, the application of 
the latter construct with respect to third party liabilities supports the elimination of 
the U.S. booked liability limitation. See infra notes 213-21 and accompanying text. 
212 In this regard, there were fairly stringent limits on treating marketable 
securities as effectively connected under the former expansion capital election, the 
prior regulatory mechanism for accumulating expansion capital. See infra note 240. 
213 See Jessica L. Katz & Charles T. Plambeck, u.s. Income Taxation of Foreign 
Corporations, 908 T.M. (BNA) A-25 (2000). 
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liabilities exceed U.S. liabilities, a reduction in U.S. liabilities to lower 
a dividend equivalent amounel4 is analogous to a transfer of funds by 
the subsidiary to the parent in connection with the parent assuming an 
additional portion of the third-party liabilities equal to the reduction 
in U.S. liabilities.215 This is because in both the branch and subsidiary 
settings, funds generated by U.S. operations would be invested in 
assets whose income is not subject to U.S. net basis taxation,216 with a 
reduction in the amount of liabilities for determining the interest 
expense deduction taken against the U.S. tax base.217 
In the subsidiary setting, the amount of a distribution for purposes 
of the dividend tax is reduced by the amount of any liability of the 
subsidiary that is assumed by the parent in connection with the 
distribution.218 Thus, the dividend tax will not apply where a U.S. 
subsidiary transfers funds to its foreign parent and the parent assumes 
214 This assumes that the foreign corporation's effectively connected E&P for the 
year exceeds the increase in U.S. net equity, disregarding the reduction in U.S. 
liabilities. 
215 Treasury used a similar construct in analyzing the use of imputed liabilities to 
determine U.S. net equity. See Preamble to Temporary and Proposed Regulations 
under Section 884, reprinted in Service Issues Branch Profits Tax Regulation, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Aug. 30, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 88 TNT 
178-2) (treating an increase in the amount of liabilities imputed to the U.S. branch as 
analogous to a U.S. subsidiary's assumption of a portion of the liabilities of its foreign 
parent; apparently viewing a decrease in the branch's imputed liabilities as analogous 
to an assumption by a foreign parent of liabilities of its U.S. subsidiary). 
216 In the branch setting, this is a result of the assumed fact that effectively 
connected E&P exceeds the increase in U.S. net equity, disregarding the reduction in 
U.S. liabilities. See supra note 214. 
217 As discussed earlier, it is appropriate to consider the tax consequences of the 
reduction of liabilities in the branch and subsidiary settings despite the legal 
differences involved. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. In this regard, 
it should be noted that the interest rate on U.S. booked liabilities that are treated as 
assumed in the branch setting may continue to affect the determination of the U.S. 
branch's interest deduction (if the foreign corporation uses the adjusted U.S. booked 
liabilities method, see supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text), while the interest 
rate on liabilities that are actually assumed in the subsidiary setting will no longer 
affect the determination of the U.S. subsidiary's interest deduction. However, this 
does not appear to be a significant enough difference to prevent the application of 
this construct. 
218 See I.R.c. § 301(b)(2). For this purpose, the liability must be assumed within 
the meaning of section 3S7(d), which generally requires that (i) in the case of recourse 
liabilities, the transferee has agreed to, and is expected to satisfy the liability, whether 
or not the transferor is relieved of the liability, and (ii) in the case of nonrecourse 
liabilities, the transferee acquires any asset subject to the liability. See Treas. Reg. 
§ l.301-1(g)(1) (2003); 1.R.c. § 3S7(d)(1)(A). 
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an equal amount of liabilities of the subsidiary.219 To promote the 
neutral tax treatment of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries, a foreign 
corporation with a U.S. branch should have the same opportunity to 
shift funds outside of the United States without incurring a second-
level tax, by reducing the amount of liabilities that are taken into 
account for U.S. tax purposes. Therefore, neutrality would be better 
achieved by permitting a foreign corporation for purposes of the 
branch profits tax (and interest deduction calculation) to reduce its 
U.S. liabilities below the amount of its U.S. booked liabilities.220 
Upon the termination of the U.S. branch, there should be no 
recapture of earnings that are accumulated as a result of the enhanced 
election to reduce liabilities, for reasons similar to those expressed in 
the previous section.221 Where a U.S. subsidiary transfers funds to its 
foreign parent in connection with the parent's assumption of 
219 Although it is unlikely that a shareholder would assume a corporate liability 
in connection with a cash distribution (as opposed to property distribution), the 
amount of the distribution would be reduced by the liability assumed. See BITIKER & 
EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 8-11. If the amount of earnings transferred by the U.S. 
subsidiary is equal to the amount of third party liabilities assumed by the foreign 
parent, the amount of the distribution would be zero, as the transferred earnings 
would be fully offset by the additional third party liabilities assumed by the parent. 
With a distribution of zero, there would be no dividend (and therefore no gross 
income) under section 301(c)(1). Consequently, there would be no FDAP income for 
purposes of section 881(a). See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(1) (2000) (FDAP income 
requires that there be gross income). 
220 As noted above, an assumption of liabilities will be treated as occurring in the 
U.S. subsidiary setting only if the parties satisfy certain standards contained in 
section 357(d). See supra note 218. To bring about similar treatment in the U.S. 
branch setting, in connection with this proposal consideration should be given to 
limiting a reduction in U.S. liabilities in circumstances that are analogous to those 
where section 357(d) would not treat a transferred liability as being assumed. For 
example, a reduction below the amount of U.S. booked liabilities could be prevented 
where the foreign branches of a foreign corporation have minimal net equity (non-
U.S. assets less non-U.S.-connected liabilities (non-U.S. assets multiplied by the 
foreign corporation's actual or fixed liability-to-asset ratio)) on the view that a 
similarly situated foreign parent would not be expected to satisfy a transferred 
recourse liability in this situation. In addition, a reduction below the amount of U.S. 
booked nonrecourse liabilities could be prevented to the extent that these liabilities 
encumber U.S. assets. Of course, these factors in the branch setting have no bearing 
on who is likely to bear the liability (unlike the subsidiary setting); nevertheless, it 
may be appropriate to take them into account in permitting a reduction below the 
amount of U.S. booked liabilities, in order to prevent a U.S. branch from having a 
greater ability to avoid a second-level tax as compared to a similarly situated U.S. 
subsidiary. 
221 See supra Part IV.B. 
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subsidiary liabilities, the foreign parent will not be taxable on the 
liquidation of the subsidiary to the extent of the prior transfer, 
regardless of whether there are subsequent infusions of assets into the 
subsidiary. Likewise, a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch should 
not be taxable in the analogous situation upon the termination of the 
branch. 
While it may be contended that a more available election to 
reduce branch liabilities would result in the effective repeal of the 
branch profits tax, exposure to the tax may still exist. Once the 
foreign corporation reduces its U.S. liabilities to zero, the branch 
profits tax would apply to the extent that effectively connected E&P is 
not invested in additional U.S assets.222 More importantly in terms of 
neutrality, avoiding the branch profits tax through a more liberal 
election would produce an indirect tax cost due to the loss of interest 
deductions against effectively connected income. Again, this is similar 
to the treatment of a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary, and consistent 
with the approach generally allowing for the avoidance of second-
level taxes at the cost of having the income generated by the invested 
earnings subject to net basis U.S. taxation, which is effectively the case 
with loss of interest deductions.223 
2. Potential Policy Conflicts 
Removing the U.S. booked liability limitation, in conjunction with 
eliminating the recapture rule, should not raise any additional policy 
conflicts, but would exacerbate the potential conflict examined above. 
That is, without this limitation, a foreign corporation would be able to 
make further reductions in the liability-to-asset ratio of its U.S. 
branch, thus arguably offending fungibility to a greater degree. 
However, because liability reductions do not violate the thin 
capitalization concerns underlying fungibility,224 an enhanced ability to 
reduce branch liabilities should not run counter to this policy. 
222 Because banks are so highly leveraged, it appears very unlikely that a U.S. 
banking branch would exhaust its ability to use the liability reduction election with 
the removal of U.S. booked liability limitation, although there still may be some limits 
on reducing U.S. liabilities as discussed at supra note 220. Consequently, the removal 
of this limitation may indeed eliminate exposure under the branch profits tax for 
foreign banks. 
223 See supra note 194. 
224 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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D. Providing an Election to Treat Assets as Effectively Connected 
1. Promoting Neutrality 
Even with the suggested changes to the liability reduction 
election, differences would still remain in the application of the 
branch profits and dividend taxes. Specifically, aside from reducing its 
U.S. liabilities, a foreign corporation could only avoid a branch profits 
tax on its U.S. branch earnings to the extent that it invested the 
earnings in U.S. assets, that is, assets that generally produce 
effectively connected income.225 This generally means that the assets 
must bear some connection to the business conducted by the U.S. 
branch.226 In contrast, a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary would avoid 
a dividend tax on any earnings that it retains. Moreover, there 
appears to be little possibility that the accumulated earnings tax would 
apply on the retained earnings of the U.S. subsidiary as a surrogate for 
a second-level tax, and the personal holding company tax, even if 
potentially applicable, typically should allow for generous 
accumulations without the risk of penalty.227 Accordingly, a U.S. 
subsidiary would likely not be subject to a second-level tax on 
earnings invested by the subsidiary in assets that are unrelated to the 
conduct of its U.S. business, whereas a similarly situated U.S. branch 
may well face a branch profits tax liability in these circumstances.228 
225 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, it appears very 
unlikely that a foreign corporation conducting a U.S. banking business would exhaust 
its ability to use the liability reduction election as modified in this article. See supra 
note 222. On the other hand, foreign corporations conducting non banking activities 
in the United States may well be limited in their ability to accumulate earnings 
effectively pursuant to the expanded liability reduction election, given their lower 
liability-to-asset ratios. Cf Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 73, at 113 (pointing out 
that foreign corporations financed primarily by equity can benefit little from the 
current liability reduction election). 
226 See supra notes 102-38 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 121-38 and accompanying text; Blessing, supra note 46, at 638 
(referring to the fact that a U.S. subsidiary can invest earnings in nonbusiness assets 
or outside the United States without incurring a second-level tax, and characterizing 
this as a potentially significant timing advantage versus operations using a U.S. 
branch). An exception would be where a foreign corporation invested its earnings in 
U.S. real estate held for investment and elected under section 882(d) to treat the 
income with respect to the property as effectively connected. See supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
This assumes that the foreign corporation exhausted its ability to use the liability 
reduction election, as modified in this article, to accumulate earnings effectively. As 
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Furthermore, unlike a U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch would lack the 
certainty that the earnings will be treated as retained.229 
Consequently, absent other changes, a U.S. subsidiary would continue 
to have greater flexibility and certainty in avoiding a second-level tax 
on its earnings as compared to a U.S. branch. 
It may be contended that for purposes of a neutrality analysis the 
hypothetical U.S. subsidiary construct for a U.S. branch should be 
confined to items that bear some factual connection to the foreign 
corporation's U.S. business. Accordingly, under this view, U.S. 
branch earnings that are invested in assets unrelated to the foreign 
corporation's U.S. business should be treated as if they had been 
distributed by a hypothetical U.S. subsidiary, thus justifying the 
current rules for determining U.S. assets under the branch profits tax. 
However, the Congressional reports accompanying the branch profits 
tax do not mandate such a construct, and instead appear to espouse a 
"tax" approach, as opposed to "factual connection" approach, for 
conceptualizing a U.S. branch. According to the legislative history, 
U.S. net equity should take into account assets and liabilities that are 
treated as connected with the business of the U.S. branch.230 These are 
assets and liabilities that generate income that is taxable by the United 
States on a net basis.23i Further indication of a tax approach is 
Congress's intention to apply the branch profits tax to investment 
noted earlier, it appears very unlikely for this to occur with respect to a foreign 
corporation conducting a U.S. banking business. See supra note 222. 
229 See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. 
230 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1040; S. REP. NO. 99-313, supra note 12, at 
404; H.R. REP. No. 99-426, supra note 12, at 434. As noted earlier, the regulations 
implement this approach with respect to liabilities by eschewing a factual relationship 
approach and instead using liabilities that are imputed for purposes of computing the 
U.S. branch's interest expense deduction. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
It should be noted, however, that the Senate report may call for a factual connection 
approach for conceptualizing a U.S. branch, in that the report states that U.S. assets 
should include cash needed to meet daily operating expenses, inventory, equipment, 
and other assets necessary to operate the business. See S. REP. No. 99-313, supra note 
12, at 404. Nevertheless, the report also lists investments generating effectively 
connected income as an example of items that should qualify as U.S. assets. See id. 
This report goes on to state that U.S. liabilities are liabilities directly related to the 
income of the U.S. branch and include payables, short-term obligations, and other 
liabilities necessary to meet obligations of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. See 
id. Thus, the statements in the Senate report are called into question, as they appear 
to endorse a factual relationship approach for determining U.S. liabilities, which is 
inconsistent with the explanation provided in the Bluebook, and has been flatly 
rejected by Treasury. 
231 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 9, at 1040. 
1272 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:1219 
income from U.S. real property where a foreign corporation has 
elected to treat such income as effectively connected pursuant to 
section 882( d).232 Thus, expanding the definition of U.S. assets to 
include assets unrelated to the foreign corporation's U.S. business 
appears to be consistent with the legislative history of the branch 
profits tax, provided that the assets are also treated as generating 
income subject to net basis U.S. taxation.233 And using a factual 
connection approach to determine the contours of a U.S. branch as a 
hypothetical subsidiary ignores the fact that a U.S. subsidiary can 
retain its earnings in nonbusiness assets. Thus, a factual connection 
approach for conceptualizing a U.S. branch disregards what an actual 
subsidiary could do to avoid a dividend tax, an essential factor to 
consider in achieving branch/subsidiary neutrality in the imposition of 
second-level taxes. 
Providing foreign corporations with an election to treat assets as 
effectively connected, and thus as U.S. assets, would remove this 
disparity in the application of the branch profits and dividend taxes. 
Specifically, Congress (or possibly Treasury) should expand the 
definition of effectively connected assets to include, upon election by 
a foreign corporation, investment assets giving rise to U.S. source 
income.234 As a result, a foreign corporation could avoid the branch 
232 See id. In this regard, the regulations provide that for purposes of determining 
effectively connected E&P and U.S. assets, effectively connected income includes 
income that is treated as effectively connected under any provision of the Code. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(f)(1), (d)(1)(iii) (1996); cf Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(d)(2)(xi) (1996) 
(holding that U.S. real estate held for investment is not a U.S. asset where the foreign 
corporation did not make an election under section 882(d». 
233 Indeed, Treasury apparently came to this conclusion in providing for the 
limited expansion capital election in the proposed and temporary branch profits tax 
regulations. See infra note 240. 
234 This proposal assumes no changes in the law with regard to the application of 
the accumulated earnings tax to a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation. If, however, a change is made to the accumulated earnings tax, so that it 
can potentially apply in all cases in the U.S. subsidiary setting, this article would 
continue to recommend that foreign corporations be permitted an election to treat 
U.S. source investment assets as effectively connected, but only if the assets are held 
to meet the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. This 
alternative is discussed in Part IV.E. 
Under the proposal suggested here, only assets generating U.S. source income 
would be eligible for effectively connected treatment pursuant to an election. 
Because a U.S. subsidiary can accumulate earnings in foreign assets as well as 
domestic assets, neutrality suggests that U.S. branches also should be permitted to 
elect effectively connected treatment for assets generating foreign source income. 
While this may deserve some consideration, U.S. branches should have sufficient 
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profits tax by investing its U.S. branch earnings in debt instruments, 
stock, or other investment assets generating U.S. source income,235 
provided the assets are elected to be treated as effectively 
connected.236 As discussed below, a foreign corporation should not be 
permitted to elect effectively connected treatment for a greater 
amount of assets than is necessary to reduce its dividend equivalent 
amount to zero for a particular year.237 Of course, this change would 
(and should) also result in the income from such assets being subject 
to net basis taxation under the effectively connected income tax 
regime, as opposed to gross basis taxation under the U.S. source/ 
FDAP income regime.238 This would include current income on 
elected assets as well as any gain (or loss) from the disposition of such 
assets.239 By so expanding the definition of effectively connected 
flexibility in retammg earnings without extending the election to foreign assets. 
Moreover, with the election applying to foreign assets, a foreign corporation may be 
entitled to a foreign tax credit (pursuant to section 906) that could deprive the United 
States of the ability to tax the income generated by the assets. See I.R.c. § 906. In 
this regard, a secondary purpose of the branch profits tax may be to generate revenue 
gains by encouraging the reinvestment of U.S. earnings. See Blessing, supra note 46, 
at 589 n.18. 
Some consideration should be given to excluding foreign banks from having the 
election to effectively connect investment assets. As noted earlier, it appears very 
unlikely that a foreign corporation conducting a U.S. banking business would exhaust 
its ability to use the liability reduction election as modified in this article. See supra 
note 222. Consequently, a foreign bank may well avoid any exposure under the 
branch profits tax by reducing its U.S. liabilities, and thus may not need an election to 
effectively connect assets in order to avoid the tax. On the other hand, a U.S. banking 
branch could still benefit from the certainty in retaining earnings that would be 
provided by the effectively connected election. See supra note 141; cf infra note 242. 
Moreover, a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary would have the ability to avoid a 
dividend tax either by retaining earnings or using earnings to pay down its liabilities. 
235 As an alternative, an elective, expanded rule for effectively connected assets 
could exclude stock. This alternative is addressed in the next section. See infra notes 
274-78 and accompanying text. 
236 A foreign corporation would be able to couple an election to treat assets as 
effectively connected with an election to reduce liabilities, which would allow for an 
increase in U.S net equity equal to the full amount invested in elected assets. 
237 See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text. 
238 As examined in the next section, this aspect may conflict with polices 
underlying the effectively connected income rules. See infra Part IV.D.2.a. 
239 Most income tax treaties reduce the rate of tax that the source country can 
impose on interest and dividends, as well as generally prevent the source country 
from taxing gain from the disposition of property, unless the interest, dividends or 
gains are attributable to a permanent establishment or fixed base that a foreign 
person has in the source country. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 26, at 
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assets, both U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries could invest in 
expansion capital and nonbusiness assets without generally incurring a 
second-level tax on the invested earnings, with the income on these 
investments subject to net basis taxation.240 Like a U.S. subsidiary, a 
art. 10 (dividends), art. 11 (interest), art. 13 (gains). For income to be attributable to 
a permanent establishment, the income generally needs to be derived from the assets 
or activities of the permanent establishment. See, e.g., MODEL CONVENTION, supra 
note 26, at art. 7, para. 2. Because assets that are elected as effectively connected may 
bear no relationship to a foreign corporation's U.S. permanent establishment, the 
income and gain on these assets be subject to treaty provisions that limit the United 
States' ability to tax these items. Accordingly, to allow the United States to subject 
the income and gain from elected assets to full net basis taxation, an election to treat 
assets as effectively connected should be coupled with a waiver of any available treaty 
benefits. Cf. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.897-6T(b)(2)(ii) (2003) (conditioning the 
availability of nonrecognition treatment for certain foreign to foreign exchanges of 
U.S. real property interests under FIRPTA on the waiver of certain treaty benefits). 
240 The proposed and temporary regulations under section 884 contained a 
limited version of this approach, allowing a foreign corporation to include as U.S. 
assets certain investment assets that otherwise did not give rise to effectively 
connected income. See former Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-IT(d)(11) (1988). Under 
this provision, a foreign corporation could make an annual election to treat 
marketable securities as U.S. assets in amount not greater than twenty-five percent of 
the effectively connected E&P for the current and prior two years. The elected 
securities were treated as U.S. assets only for the year of the election, with the income 
from the securities being treated as effectively connected for the year following the 
year of the election. The final branch profits tax did not include this expansion capital 
election, instead substituting the liability reduction election as a means of providing 
some relief from the automatic nature of the branch profits tax. See T.D. 8432, 1992-2 
c.B. 157. Treasury abandoned the expansion capital election in the final regulations 
because it proved to be ineffective in allowing foreign corporations to retain earnings 
for expansion without the imposition of a current branch profits tax, given that 
additional U.S. liabilities would be imputed on the invested earnings. See id. With 
the liability reduction election (as modified by the proposals contained in this article), 
the same problems would not exist under the proposal to expand the definition of 
effectively connected assets, because a foreign corporation would be able to couple an 
election to treat assets as effectively connected with an election to reduce liabilities, 
and thereby generate a sufficient increase in U.S. net equity to avoid a current branch 
profits tax liability. 
The former expansion capital election and my proposal do differ in a major 
respect. I am recommending that foreign corporations be permitted to treat 
investment assets as effectively connected, limited by the amount necessary to reduce 
the dividend equivalent amount to zero, in order to achieve parity with U.S. 
subsidiary operations in the application of second-level taxes. In contrast, the 
proposed and temporary regulations allowed a limited amount of marketable 
securities to be treated temporarily as U.S. assets, as a way of permitting a temporary 
investment of U.S. branch earnings in non-U.S. business assets. Other commentators 
have similarly proposed expanding the definition of effectively connected assets to 
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U.S. branch would then have a choice, and with nearly certain 
results,241 of whether to incur a second-level tax or instead have the 
income generated by invested earnings taxed by the United States on 
a net basis.242 
Along with this election to effectively connect assets, the Service 
should have some ability to treat elected assets as non-U.S. assets in 
order to approximate the application of the penalty taxes on 
undistributed earnings in the U.S. subsidiary setting. In the atypical 
circumstance where a privately-held foreign parent of a U.S. 
subsidiary has one or more U.S. individual shareholders, the 
accumulated earnings tax would be potentially applicable to the U.S. 
subsidiary.243 Accordingly, for the analogous situation of a U.S. 
branch of a privately-held foreign corporation having U.S. individual 
shareholders, the Service should be able to treat elected assets as non-
U.S. assets to the extent that the amount of elected assets is beyond 
what is reasonably necessary for the foreign corporation's U.S. 
include, upon election, investment assets in order to create parity between a U.S. 
subsidiary and a U.S. branch. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Comments, supra note 16 
(commenting on the proposed and temporary branch profits tax regulations and 
pointing out that a U.S. subsidiary can dispose of part of its business and temporarily 
invest the proceeds in marketable securities instead of distributing the funds to its 
foreign parent). 
241 See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text. 
242 As discussed earlier, it is possible that the presumption rule contained in the 
asset-use test provides nonbanking branches with an ability to retain earnings similar 
to that of U.S. subsidiaries. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. 
Consequently, it may be argued the proposed changes are not necessary to achieve 
neutrality in this regard. However, even if the presumption rule allows for effectively 
connected treatment of assets that are unrelated to meeting the present needs of the 
U.S. business, foreign corporations should still be provided with the election to treat 
investment assets generating U.S. source income as U.S. assets. The presumption 
rule, with its fact-specific standards, does not provide the certainty of treatment that a 
U.S. subsidiary typically has in retaining earnings. In this regard, branch profits tax 
liability can arise unexpectedly where a foreign corporation unwittingly acquires non-
U.S. assets, and the problem may become known only when the foreign corporation's 
tax return is prepared. See Genz, supra note 61, at 135. Allowing U.S. branches to 
elect U.S. asset treatment prior to the return due date would provide them with the 
certainty of earnings retention that exists in the subsidiary setting. In addition, 
providing foreign corporations with a straightforward election to retain earnings 
would have simplification benefits for the government as well as taxpayers. Similar 
considerations apply with regard to the contention that U.S. banking branches do not 
need an election to effectively connect assets, because they currently have sufficient 
flexibility in retaining earnings. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. 
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business.244 Consideration should be given to applying this treatment 
to U.S. branches of publicly-held foreign corporations as well. 245 Such 
reclassification by the Service would likely lead to a larger dividend 
equivalent amount for the particular year, thus approximating the 
second-level tax that would be imposed on a similarly situated U.S. 
subsidiary under the accumulated earnings tax.246 Alternatively, in 
these situations, the Service could curb excessive accumulations in 
elected assets by applying the accumulated earnings tax itself to the 
foreign corporation. Because the situations involve foreign 
corporations with one or more U.S. individual shareholders, the 
accumulated earnings tax generally should apply247 if the foreign 
corporation accumulates earnings to avoid the individual income tax 
on its shareholders.248 
244 For this purpose, the standard should be the same as under the accumulated 
earnings tax. See infra note 311. In rare situations, the accumulated earnings tax also 
would be potentially applicable to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent with only 
foreign shareholders. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. Consequently, 
consideration should be given to allowing potential reclassification of elected assets 
for analogous situations involving U.S. branches of foreign corporations with only 
foreign shareholders. See supra note 87 for such analogous situations. 
245 Where a widely-held foreign parent has some U.S. shareholders, it appears to 
be very unlikely that a U.S. subsidiary of the foreign parent would be found to 
accumulate earnings in order to avoid the individual tax on the foreign parent's U.S. 
shareholders. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. Consequently, while 
consideration should be given to applying the accumulated earnings tax analogue to 
U.S. branches of widely-held foreign corporations, this may not be appropriate given 
the treatment of similarly situated U.S. subsidiaries. Perhaps the analogue should 
only apply where there is evidence that an unreasonable accumulation occurred in 
order to benefit directly the U.S. shareholders of the widely-held foreign corporation. 
246 This raises issues as to whether reclassified assets should nevertheless be 
treated as effectively connected for regular tax purposes, as well as whether 
modifications to the branch profits tax may be appropriate given that the accumulated 
earnings tax can function as a third level of taxation. These issues are examined at 
infra note 311. 
247 See Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(c) (1959) (stating that, among other circumstances, 
the accumulated earnings tax is applicable to a foreign corporation if any of its 
shareholders are U.S. citizens or residents); I.R.C. § 532(b) (noting that passive 
foreign investment companies are excluded from the application of the accumulated 
earnings tax). 
248 However, the application of the accumulated earnings tax to a foreign 
corporation may differ from the application of the tax to a U.S. subsidiary conducting 
a U.S. business, the construct for a U.S. branch. This is because the former would 
take into account the needs of any U.S. or foreign businesses of the foreign 
corporation, whereas the latter may be limited to taking into account only the U.S. 
business needs of the U.S. subsidiary. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(b) (1959) (providing 
that under certain circumstances the business of a subsidiary may be considered the 
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Similarly, the Service should be able to treat elected assets as non-
V.S. assets in circumstances analogous to those where a similarly 
situated V.S. subsidiary would be subject to the personal holding 
company tax.249 Specifically, reclassification could occur for a taxable 
year ("the current year") in situations where the gross income from all 
elected assets (whether elected in the current year or any other year) 
equals or exceeds sixty percent of the foreign corporation's effectively 
connected gross income for the current year, provided more than fifty 
percent of the foreign corporation's stock is owned (directly or 
indirectly) by five or fewer individuals at any time during the last half 
of the current year.250 In this case, assets elected in the current year 
would be reclassified as non-V .S. assets. As with the analogue to the 
accumulated earnings tax, reclassification would likely increase the 
dividend equivalent amount for the year,251 resulting in a second-level 
business of the parent for purposes of applying the reasonable needs of the business 
standard to the parent). But see Inland Terminals, Inc. v. U.S., 477 F.2d 836 (4th CiT. 
1973) (holding that the reasonable business needs of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
include the reasonable business needs of its parent). Thus, given the U.S. subsidiary 
construct for a U.S. branch, it may be more appropriate to consider only the needs of 
the U.S. business in curbing excess accumulations, which is what the accumulated 
earnings tax analogue does. Of course, it would also be possible to modify the 
application of the accumulated earnings tax to foreign corporations so as only to take 
into account the needs of a foreign corporation's U.S. business. 
249 As a result of a 2004 amendment, the personal holding company tax no longer 
applies to foreign corporations. See 1.R.c. § 542(c)(5). Even before the 2004 change, 
the personal holding company tax did not apply to a foreign corporation owned 
entirely by nonresident aliens, either directly or indirectly through foreign entities. 
See former 1.R.c. § 542(c)(7). Consequently, an analogue to the personal holding tax 
is needed in order to treat U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries similarly with regard to 
excessive accumulations. Excluded from the application of the personal holding 
company tax are several types of corporations, including banks, life insurance 
companies, and lending or finance companies. See 1.R.c. § 542(c). To promote 
neutrality, there should be similar exclusions in applying the personal holding 
company analogue to U.S. branches. 
250 Cf supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
251 As with the analogue to the accumulated earnings tax, this raises issues as to 
whether reclassified assets should nevertheless be treated as effectively connected for 
regular tax purposes, as well as whether modifications to the branch profits tax may 
be appropriate given that the personal holding company tax can function as a third 
level of taxation. These issues are examined at infra note 311, in the context of an 
analogue to the accumulated earnings tax that is contained in an alternative proposal 
providing an effectively connected election. In this connection, a third level of tax is 
less likely with the application of the personal holding tax as compared to the 
accumulated earnings tax, because of the deficiency dividend procedure contained in 
section 547; thus, there is less justification for modifying the branch profits tax for 
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tax similar to imposing the personal holding company tax in the 
subsidiary setting.252 
It may be contended that the election to treat assets as effectively 
connected would result in the effective repeal of the branch profits 
tax. With this feature, foreign corporations would often have the 
ability to eliminate their liability under the branch profits tax by 
electing to treat a sufficient amount of assets as being effectively 
connected (possibly coupled with an election to reduce U.S. 
liabilities). Nevertheless, the election would likely also produce a 
cost, in that the income generated by the affected assets would be 
subject to U.S. net basis taxation. While dividend-paying stock would 
probably fare better under net basis taxation as compared to gross 
basis taxation because of the dividends-received deduction,253 debt 
instruments and growth stock would likely do worse tax-wise given 
h I . f' 254 d .255 d h t e genera exemptIOns or mterest an asset gams un er t e 
withholding tax. If, as alternatively suggested below, stock were 
ineligible for effectively connected treatment,256 the election would 
likely result in greater U.S. tax on the income produced by the 
affected assets.257 Consequently, the branch profits tax would 
continue to affect, albeit indirectly, the U.S. tax liability of foreign 
purposes of implementing an analogue to the personal holding companying tax. 
252 As an alternative to this rough analogue to the personal holding company tax, 
consideration should be given towards developing a more precise analogue that 
applies the details of the personal holding company tax to a U.S. branch. Cf supra 
notes 94--98 and accompanying text. Such an approach could apply the specific rules 
of the personal holding company tax, but only taking into account a foreign 
corporation's effectively connected income. This could include the imposition of a 
separate penalty tax on a foreign corporation's "undistributed effectively connected 
personal holding company income," if the personal holding company ownership and 
income tests are met. This more precise analogue could apply regardless of whether a 
foreign corporation elects to treat assets as effectively connected. 
253 See I.R.c. § 243. 
254 See I.R.c. §§ 881(c), (d). 
255 See I.R.c. § 881; Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b) (2000). 
256 See infra notes 274--78 and accompanying text. 
257 If, however, the additional U.S. assets resulted in additional U.S.-connected 
liabilities and therefore deductible interest, this would reduce the taxable income 
generated by the additional assets. However, the foreign corporation may want to 
reduce the amount of U.S.-connected liabilities (and U.S. liabilities) that would be 
imputed to the additional U.S. assets in order to reduce its branch profits tax 
exposure (by increasing its U.S. net equity). Moreover, there would be limits on a 
foreign corporation's ability to use the effectively connected election to increase its 
deductible interest. See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text. 
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corporations' U.S. branch operations,258and in a manner that is similar 
to the way in which the dividend tax affects similarly situated U.S. 
subsidiaries. Thus, similar to a U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. branch 
generally would have a choice of whether to incur a branch profits tax 
or instead have the income on the invested earnings subject to net 
basis U.S. taxation.259 
2. Potential Policy Conflicts 
a. Policies Underlying the Effectively Connected Income Rules 
At first blush, it would appear that permitting foreign 
corporations to elect effectively connected treatment of investment 
assets that are unrelated to the conduct of the foreign corporation's 
U.S. business would violate the policies underlying the effectively 
connected income rules. After all, such a change arguably runs 
counter to section 864(c)(2), which, as explicated by its legislative 
history, appears to require a factual connection between the income 
(or underlying asset) and the activities of the foreign corporation's 
U.S. trade or business in order for U.S. source capital gain or FDAP 
income to be effectively connected.260 Indeed, a statutory amendment 
to this section may well be required to effectuate this change.261 
However, a closer examination suggests that such an expansion of 
effectively connected assets does not appear to implicate the concerns 
that led to the adoption of a factual connection standard for subjecting 
income on investment assets to net basis taxation. 
258 In this regard, another reason for the branch profits may have been to 
generate revenue gains by encouraging the reinvestment of U.S. branch earnings. See 
Blessing, supra note 46, at 589. 
259 See supra text accompanying notes 155-60. 
260 See S. REp. No. 1707, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 
1055; H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 133. 
261 That is, Treasury may lack the power to effectuate the change by amending 
the regulations under section 864(c). In this regard, the House and Senate reports in 
explaining the application of section 864(c)(2) state "[t]hus, for example, are the 
assets held for future, or remittent, use in the business?" See S. REP. No. 1707, supra 
note 260, at 1072; H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 130, at 977. This would appear to 
exclude investment assets that have no connection to the foreign corporation's U.S. 
business. On the other hand, Treasury felt that it had the power to promulgate the 
former expansion capital election (contained in the former temporary branch tax 
regulations), which likewise did not require a relationship between the holding of the 
elected assets and the conduct of the U.S. business. See supra note 240. 
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Prior to the enactment of section 864(c)(2), a foreign person with 
a U.S. business was subject to net basis taxation on all of its U.S. 
source income, under the so-called "force of attraction" rule.262 
Several concerns led Congress to adopt the factual connection 
standard contained in section 864(c)(2) in place of the force of 
attraction rule for U.S. source investment income. First, Congress was 
concerned that the force of attraction rule distorted a foreign 
corporation's decision of whether to engage in business or invest in 
the United States.263 This rule may have deterred foreign corporations 
with U.S. source investment income from engaging in a U.S. business 
because doing so would subject the investment income to net basis 
taxation without any applicable treaty reductions in the tax rate.264 
Similarly, the force of attraction rule may also have deterred a foreign 
corporation with a U.S business from investing in the United States.265 
Congress also believed that the substantial difference in the tax 
treatment of U.S. investment income, depending on the existence (or 
not) of an unrelated U.S. business, was both inequitable and 
·11 . I 266 1 oglca. 
In addition, Congress wanted to ensure that U.S. source dividends 
generally are fully subject to U.S. tax.267 Net basis taxation of 
dividends provides a foreign corporation with a dividends-received 
deduction, which removes at least seventy percent of the dividend 
from the taxable base.268 Also, prior to the enactment of the branch 
profits tax,269 there rarely was a second-level U.S. tax on the dividends 
when these amounts were ultimately distributed to the shareholders of 
262 See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 133, 1966-2 c.B. at 972; Harvey P. Dale, 
Effectively Connected Income, 42 TAX L. REV. 689, 690 (1987). 
263 See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 133, 1966-2 C.B. at 976. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-40-005 (May 15, 1989) (referring to a May 13, 
1966 statement by Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of Treasury, before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Tax Conventions, for proposition that Congress 
intentionally drew the effectively connected test narrowly because of concern over the 
ability of foreign corporations to effectively connect dividends and thereby take 
advantage of the dividends-received deduction to virtually eliminate U.S. tax on the 
dividends). 
268 See 1.R.c. § 243(a). At the time that section 864(c)(2) was enacted, 
section 243 generally provided for an eighty-five percent dividends-received 
deduction. See former 1.R.c. § 243(a) (1964). 
269 This was the case when Congress adopted section 864(c)(2). 
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the foreign corporation.270 Consequently, the factual connection 
standard contained in section 864(c)(2) was aimed in part at 
channeling most U.S. source dividends to gross basis taxation under 
the U.S. sourcefFDAP regime,271 so as to include the full amount of 
the dividend in the taxable base. 
Providing an election to treat assets as effectively connected does 
not appear to implicate the concerns that led to the adoption of the 
factual connection standard contained in section 864(c)(2). First, 
foreign corporations should not be deterred from engaging in business 
or investing in the United States because they always can refrain from 
electing effectively connected status for the investments. This 
nonelection would subject the investment income to the tax under 
section 881(a) (including any exemptions or exceptions) along with 
any applicable treaty reductions.272 Also, allowing a foreign 
corporation to elect net basis taxation for investment income does not 
appear to be inequitable or illogical, given that a foreign corporation 
with a U.S. subsidiary can effectively do the same by having the U.S. 
subsidiary hold the investments.273 
Finally, it would appear that elective net basis taxation of U.S. 
dividends (with a corresponding dividends-received deduction) is not 
inconsistent with Congress's desire to have U.S. source dividends fully 
taxed in most cases. Unlike the ineffective second-level U.S. tax that 
existed upon the enactment of section 864(c)(2), the dividends 
generally will be fully subject to a second-level U.S. tax under the 
branch profits tax when treated as remitted outside of the United 
States.274 Although prior dividends may escape a second-level tax 
upon a tax-free termination of the U.S. branch,275 this is no different 
than the tax treatment of dividends received by a U.S. subsidiary 
where the subsidiary liquidates into its foreign parent before making 
nonliquidating distributions of the earnings generated by the prior 
270 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
271 To the extent not effectively connected, U.S. source dividends are generally 
taxable under section 881(a). 
272 This assumes that the income is not otherwise effectively connected. 
273 As mentioned earlier, however, the legislative history to section 864(c)(2) 
indicates that Congress was concerned with subjecting investment income to net basis 
taxation based on the existence of an unrelated U.S. business conducted by the 
taxpayer. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
274 While not indicated in the legislative history, the lack of an effective second-
level U.S. tax under prior law may have been an important factor in Congress's 
decision to limit the ability to have U.S. source dividends subject to net basis taxation. 
275 See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
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dividends.276 Nevertheless, if one desires greater assurance of fully 
taxing U.S. source dividends, an alternative would be to exclude stock 
investments from the election to effectively connect assets. Possibly 
for this reason,277 Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2) generally excludes stock 
as an asset that is eligible for effectively connected treatment under 
the asset use test.278 
b. Other Policies 
The proposal to provide foreign corporations with an election to 
effectively connect assets may also raise concerns of administrability. 
As discussed above, along with the election to treat investment assets 
as effectively connected, the Service should have some ability to treat 
elected assets as being noneffectively connected,279 which may further 
complicate the application of the branch profits tax. In particular, 
reclassification pursuant to the analogue to the accumulated earnings 
tax would require a determination of whether the investment is held 
to meet the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. 
business,280 which would entail the somewhat nebulous standards and 
potential enforceability difficulties that arguably plague the 
accumulated earnings tax.281 Nevertheless, the administrative burdens 
should be minimal in light of the limited situations where this type of 
reclassification may apply.282 Moreover, the ability to elect effectively 
connected status for investment assets should reduce the number of 
situations where it is necessary to apply the asset-use test and its "held 
for the present needs" standard, along with its presumption rule.283 
276 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
277 Another, and probably more important, reason for excluding stock as an 
effectively connected asset under the asset-use test may be to prevent foreign 
corporations from effectively imputing interest deductions to assets that may not be 
producing current income. See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of possible taxpayer manipulation of the interest deduction under Treas. 
Reg. § 1.882-5 with an elective effectively connected rule for investment assets. 
278 See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2)(iii)(a) (2005). A recent amendment to the 
asset-use test removes the exclusion with respect to certain stock held by foreign 
insurance companies. See Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4( c )(2)(iii)(b) (2005); supra note 116. 
279 See supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
281 See infra note 323. 
282 See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text. 
283 This is true because taxpayers desiring effectively connected treatment for 
investment assets would presumably be electing such treatment, rather than having 
the determination made under the asset-use test. 
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These tests can be uncertain in their application, and therefore 
avoiding them should make administration easier.284 Consequently, 
the suggested expansion of effectively connected assets should not 
result in significant administrative burdens, and may indeed serve to 
simplify the administration of the tax rules applying to U.S. branches. 
Potential taxpayer manipulation may be another concern with a 
rule allowing for effectively connected treatment for investment assets 
upon a taxpayer's election. Specifically, foreign corporations may 
strategically elect effectively connected status for investment assets in 
order to increase their interest expense deduction under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.882-5. By increasing the amount of U.S. assets via the election, 
more interest expense would be imputed to a foreign corporation's 
U.S. branch;285 yet, because the additional U.S. assets may yield little 
or no current taxable income, the election could result in lower 
amounts of effectively connected taxable income.286 If stock were 
excluded as an asset eligible for elective effectively connected 
treatment, an alternative suggested above,287 the potential for such 
manipulation would be reduced. A straightforward way of 
eliminating any possibility for manipulation would be to decline to 
impute liabilities on assets elected for effectively connected 
treatment.288 Regardless, a foreign corporation should not be 
permitted to elect effectively connected treatment for a greater 
amount of assets than is necessary to reduce its dividend equivalent 
amount to zero for a particular year; neutrality in the application of 
second-level taxes requires no more than this. Moreover, the earnings 
stripping rule may apply to cap the amount of currently deductible 
interest. 289 
284 See supra notes 111-16, 125-33 and accompanying text; see, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 89-40-005 (May 15, 1989), I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-29-027 (Mar. 29, 
1977). 
285 See supra note 43 for a discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5. 
286 This appears to be Treasury's concern in taking the position in the regulations 
that stock generally cannot be effectively connected under the asset-use test. See 
Katz & Plambeck, supra note 213, at A-47. 
287 See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text. 
288 Indeed, in many cases foreign corporations may desire this result in order to 
increase their U.S. net equity and thereby lower their dividend equivalent amount. 
Thus, in the absence of a rule that does not impute U.S. liabilities on elected assets, 
foreign corporations may want to achieve the same result by coupling an effectively 
connected election with an election to reduce U.S. liabilities. 
289 See 1.R.c. § 163(j); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-8, 52 FR 24,996, 24,999 (July 2, 
1987). 
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E. Election to Treat Assets as Effectively Connected with Changes to 
the Accumulated Earnings Tax 
As noted above, the proposal to provide foreign corporations 
with an election to treat investment assets generating U.S. source 
income as effectively connected assets assumes that there are no 
changes with regard to the application of the accumulated earnings 
tax.290 Under current law, the accumulated earnings tax apparently 
would rarely even apply potentially to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation. If a change does occur, such that the accumulated 
earnings tax would be potentially applicable in all cases in the U.S. 
subsidiary setting, this section recommends that foreign corporations 
be permitted an election to treat U.S. source investment assets as 
effectively connected, provided the assets are held to meet the 
reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. 
1. Possible Change in the Application of the Accumulated Earnings 
Tax to U.S. Subsidiaries 
As previously discussed, in the typical situation involving a U.S. 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, the accumulated earnings tax 
apparently would not even potentially apply, regardless of whether 
earnings are accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the 
subsidiary's business. The regulations under this tax require a 
purpose to avoid the imposition of the individual income tax on the 
subsidiary's shareholders (either direct or indirect), and this purpose 
is very likely not to exist with respect to a wholly owned U.S. 
subsidiary of a privately-held foreign corporation with no individual 
U.S. shareholders (which should be the norm). Moreover, even 
though a widely-held foreign corporation may well have some U.S. 
shareholders, it appears very unlikely that its U.S. subsidiary would be 
found to accumulate earnings for the purpose of avoiding the 
individual tax on the foreign parent's U.S. shareholders. Thus, most 
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations would appear to be able to 
retain earnings without the limitations imposed pursuant to the 
I d · 291 accumu ate earmngs tax. 
Effectively exempting most U.S. subsidiaries 
corporations from the accumulated earnings tax is a 
290 See supra note 234. 
of foreign 
questionable 
291 For a more complete explanation of the application of the accumulated 
earnings tax in the subsidiary setting, see supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
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1· 292 h d· po ICy. A purpose of t e accumulate earmngs tax is to provide a 
backstop to the shareholder-level tax by forcing the payment of 
dividends.293 This purpose is certainly relevant in the context of a U.S. 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, regardless of who owns the 
foreign parent; without potential liability under the accumulated 
earnings tax, the U.S. subsidiary may have little incentive to payout 
dividends, especially since earnings can usually be repatriated tax-free 
to the foreign parent on the liquidation of the subsidiary.294 Indeed, 
several commentators appear to be of the view that the accumulated 
earnings tax is fully applicable in the context of a wholly owned U.S. 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, presumably because of the 
purpose of the tax.295 Moreover, the current rule produces seemingly 
arbitrary results, in that a U.S. subsidiary owned directly by foreign 
individuals would have potential liability under accumulated earnings 
tax.2% There appears to be no sensible reason for protecting the 
dividend tax in this case but not where the shareholder is a foreign 
corporation, especially given that the dividend tax rate under the 
Code would typically be the same in both situations.297 
292 Treasury may not have intended this result in originally crafting Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.532-1(a)(1). Because a corporate shareholder would generally be entitled to a 
dividends-received deduction with respect to distributed earnings, the accumulated 
earnings tax has traditionally focused on avoidance of the dividend tax with respect to 
individual shareholders. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 91, at 7-6. Accordingly, 
the regulations refer to the purpose of avoiding the imposition of the individual 
income tax on shareholders. However, because a foreign corporation receiving a 
dividend would generally not be entitled to a dividends-received deduction, requiring 
a purpose to avoid the individual income tax seems inappropriate in the context of a 
foreign shareholder. Treasury may simply have overlooked this situation when 
originally writing the regulation. Nevertheless, Treasury could have amended the 
regulation to cover a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation; indeed, Treasury did 
propose such an amendment, but it was subsequently withdrawn. See infra note 298. 
293 See 2 JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, 
C3-22 to -23 (2005); STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE 
TAXATION 648 (6th ed. 2005). 
294 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
295 See Brown, supra note 4, at 158 n.141; Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 219-
20; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 162, 164; KUNTZ & PERONI, supra 
note 293, at C3-22 to -23. 
296 Cf AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 21, at 164 (stating that it is 
appropriate to apply the accumulated earnings tax to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation, because the withholding tax borne by the parent on dividends from the 
subsidiary may be regarded as a surrogate for the individual shareholder tax that 
would have been imposed if the individual shareholders had directly owned the U.S. 
corporation). 
297 For both nonresident aliens and foreign corporations, the Code generally 
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It may be appropriate then to modify the accumulated earnings 
tax so that it potentially applies in all cases involving U.S. subsidiaries 
of foreign corporations. To this end, Treasury apparently could revise 
the regulations to provide that a purpose to avoid the section 881 tax 
would also trigger the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, or 
Congress could amend the statute to so provide.298 If this were to 
occur, a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation would very likely be 
subject to an accumulated earnings tax liability if it retained earnings 
beyond the reasonable needs of its business.299 
2. Promoting Neutrality 
With this modification to accumulated earnings tax, differences 
would still exist in the abilities of U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries 
to control the timing and impact of second-level taxes, with no 
changes to the branch profits tax other than those recommended with 
respect to the liability reduction election. Aside from reducing its 
U.S. liabilities, a foreign corporation could avoid a branch profits tax 
on its U.S. branch earnings to the extent that it invested the earnings 
in U.S. assets.3OO In contrast, a similarly situated U.S. subsidiary could 
imposes a thirty percent withholding tax with respect to dividends received from a 
U.S. corporation. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a)(1), 881(a), 1441(a), 1442(a), 861(a)(2); supra 
note 26 and accompanying text. A full or partial exemption from the withholding tax 
applies to dividends from U.S. corporations with substantial foreign business 
activities. See 1.R.c. §§ 871(i)(2)(B), 881(d), 861(c), 1441(c)(1O), 1442(a). In very 
limited circumstances, dividends received by foreign persons may be treated as 
effectively connected income, in which case the applicable tax rates would be based 
on the graduated rates under sections 1 and 11, and a foreign corporate recipient 
would generally be entitled to a dividends-received deduction. See 1.R.c. 
§§ 864(c)(2), 871(b), 882(a), 882(c), 243(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(5) 
(2005); supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
298 Indeed, Treasury once proposed an amendment to the regulations that would 
have provided for this treatment, although it ultimately withdrew the proposed 
amendment without explanation. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 
84,088 (Dec. 22, 1980), withdrawn, 48 Fed. Reg. 25,228 (June 6, 1983). Treasury 
would appear to have the authority to amend the regulation in this manner; the 
statute does not expressly limit the purpose to the avoidance of the individual tax, 
although such a limitation may be implied by the statutory language. See 1.R.c. 
§ 532(a) ("purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the 
shareholders of any other corporation"). 
299 See 1.R.c. § 533(a). 
300 See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, while it 
appears very unlikely that foreign corporations conducting U.S. banking businesses 
would exhaust their ability to use the expanded liability reduction election, foreign 
corporations conducting nonbanking activities in the United States may well be 
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avoid a dividend tax as well as an accumulated earnings tax by 
investing its earnings in assets that are held to meet the reasonable 
needs of its U.S. business.3D1 
With these different standards, it is not clear which structure 
affords greater flexibility in retaining earnings, the determination 
being dependent on an interpretation of the rules and the particular 
facts. For example, with regard to U.S. branches not engaged in a 
banking business, investment-type assets generally need to be held to 
meet the present needs of the U.S. business in order to be effectively 
connected assets.302 Under this rule, a U.S. branch would have less 
flexibility in retaining earnings than a similarly situated U.S. 
subsidiary, which could hold investment assets for future U.S. business 
needs and avoid a second-level tax.303 However, the rules applicable 
to non banking branches also provide for a presumption of effectively 
connected treatment where an asset was acquired with funds 
generated by that business, the income from the asset is reinvested or 
retained in that business, and U.S. branch personnel significantly 
managed and controlled the investment of the asset.304 It is unclear 
whether the Service can rebut the presumption by demonstrating that 
the asset is not held to meet the present needs of the U.S. business.305 
If so, then a U.S. subsidiary would appear to have greater flexibility in 
retaining earnings, as it could hold assets for future U.S. business 
needs and avoid a second-level tax. If the presumption is not 
rebuttable by the Service, a U.S. branch qualifying for the 
presumption may have the greater flexibility, given that it may be able 
to hold assets (excluding stock generally) without regard to business 
need and avoid a branch profits tax.306 
limited in their ability to accumulate earnings pursuant to the election. See supra note 
225. 
301 See generally 1.R.c. §§ 531-533; infra note 311. The accumulated earnings tax 
generally allows a corporation to retain during its lifetime a minimum of $250,000 of 
earnings without regard to business need (which is referred to as the minimum 
accumulated earnings credit). See 1.R.c. § 535(c)(2). 
302 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
303 See infra note 311; Musher, supra note 45, at 112-13 (pointing out that foreign 
corporations operating through U.S. subsidiaries have greater flexibility to 
accumulate earnings for future needs than do those operating through U.S. branches 
that are apparently subject to the branch profits tax when they accumulate earnings 
for future needs). 
304 See supra note 115. 
305 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
306 The foreign corporation would still need to satisfy the other requirements of 
the presumption rule for the assets to be effectively connected; in particular, the 
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For U.S. banking branches and subsidiaries, their relative 
flexibility in retaining earnings would depend on the particular facts. 
Under the special banking rules, a U.S. banking branch can effectively 
connect a limited amount of certain investment securities, typically 
long-term corporate bonds and municipal government bonds, as well 
as an unlimited amount of other securities such as short-term 
corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds; U.S. banking branches 
can do so whether or not the securities are held for present or future 
business needs.30? Consequently, for accumulations in securities 
consisting of long-term corporate or municipal bonds beyond a U.S. 
branch's investment securities limit, a U.S. subsidiary may have the 
greater flexibility, as it would be able to retain earnings in these types 
of securities if it has a reasonable business need.308 In contrast, a U.S. 
branch could not do so even with such a need. Nevertheless, a U.S. 
branch could retain earnings in short-term corporate and U.S. 
government bonds without regard to any tax limitations. For 
accumulations up to the investment securities limit (and greater than 
the minimum accumulated earnings credie09), the U.S. branch would 
have the greater flexibility, as it could retain earnings in any of these 
securities regardless of need, whereas a U.S. subsidiary could only do 
so if it has a reasonable business need for the accumulation.310 
To make the application of the branch profits and dividend taxes 
more equivalent, U.S. branches and U.S. subsidiaries should have a 
similar ability to retain U.S. earnings while avoiding a second-level 
tax. Accordingly, with the above-described change to the 
accumulated earnings tax, a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch 
should be permitted an election to treat investment assets producing 
U.S. source income as being effectively connected, provided the assets 
are held to meet the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's 
U.S. business.311 For this purpose, the reasonable business needs 
income from the assets would need to be reinvested or retained in the U.S. business. 
See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. 
308 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009 (May 29, 1998) (applying the 
accumulated earnings tax to a bank, and examining the bank's business need for 
retaining earnings in liquid assets such as cash, cash deposits with the federal reserve 
system, and taxable and tax-exempt securities). 
309 See supra note 30l. 
310 Cf I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009 (May 29, 1998). 
311 Cf Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 220 (appearing to recommend an 
election to treat assets as effectively connected to the extent of the amount of 
reasonable future anticipated needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business; 
apparently calling for an interest charge on certain portions of the branch profits tax 
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standard should be the same as under the accumulated earnings tax.3I2 
liability that are deferred as a result of such treatment). 
If elected assets are not held for the reasonable needs of the business conducted 
by the U.S. branch, the assets would be disqualified for effectively connected 
treatment for purposes of the branch profits tax. However, it would appear that the 
assets should still be considered as generating effectively connected income for 
regular tax purposes. This would be consistent with an application of the 
accumulated earnings tax in the context of a U.S. subsidiary, where earnings subject 
to the penalty tax continue to remain in corporate solution, and thereby generate 
income subject to net basis taxation by the United States (if invested in income-
producing assets). In a similar vein, modifications to the workings of the branch 
profits tax may be appropriate given that the accumulated earnings tax can function 
as a third level of taxation. See James C. Warner & Lauren T. Byrne, Accumulated 
Earnings Tax, 796-2nd T.M. (BNA) at A-l. That is, following the imposition of the 
accumulated earnings tax on a corporation's retained earnings, a shareholder level tax 
would normally be imposed on these earnings when they are ultimately distributed to 
the corporation's shareholders (either in the nonliquidating or liquidating context). 
Nevertheless, a third level of tax is mitigated somewhat in the case of a U.S. 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, given that a liquidating distribution generally 
would not be subject to a shareholder level tax. See supra note 146 and accompanying 
text. Therefore, there may not be a strong need to modify the branch profits tax in 
order to achieve parity with the application of the accumulated earnings and 
shareholder level taxes in the subsidiary setting. If modifications were to occur, I 
suggest that solely for purposes of reducing accumulated effectively connected E&P 
by the dividend equivalent amount for the year of the asset election, see Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.884-1(b)(3)(ii) (1996), the dividend equivalent amount should exclude the amount 
of disqualified elected assets; as a result, the amount of disqualified elected assets 
would not be removed from accumulated effectively connected E&P. This would be 
similar to the application of the accumulated earnings tax, where retained earnings 
subject to the penalty tax are not removed from ·E&P. I also suggest that assets that 
are disqualified for the year of the election nevertheless be treated as U.S. assets for 
determining dividend equivalent amounts for subsequent years (regardless of whether 
the assets are held for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business). This would be 
consistent with not reducing accumulated effectively connected E&P by the amount 
of disqualified assets, and would result in a third level of tax (pursuant to the branch 
profits tax) if the elected assets were subsequently sold and the proceeds were 
invested in assets beyond the scope of net basis U.S. taxation, similar to a U.S. 
subsidiary's nonliquidating distribution of earnings previously subject to the 
accumulated earnings tax. 
312 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1, -2 (1986). In this regard, the regulations 
include the following grounds, if supported by sufficient facts, as possibly satisfying 
the reasonable business needs standard: (i) providing for business expansion or plant 
replacement, (ii) acquiring a business enterprise, (iii) providing for the retirement of 
indebtedness created in connection with the business, (iv) providing for necessary 
working capital for the business, (v) providing for investments or loans to suppliers or 
customers if needed to maintain the business, and (vi) providing for the payment of 
reasonably anticipated product liability losses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b) (1986). 
Given the number of foreign corporations that conduct banking or insurance 
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In addition, similar to the minimum accumulated earnings credit,3!3 a 
foreign corporation with a U.S. branch generally should be permitted 
to elect during its existence at least $250,000 of U.S. source assets as 
being effectively connected, regardless of whether the assets are held 
for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business.3!4 To ensure that U.S. 
branches would not have greater flexibility than U.S. subsidiaries in 
retaining earnings, the presumption rule should be eliminated (at least 
for foreign corporations), since this provision may not require a 
business need in order to effectively connect assets.3!5 Also, 
consideration should be given to eliminating the ability of U.S. 
banking branches to effectively connect investment securities that 
have no relationship to the U.S business (other than participation by 
U.S. branch personnel in arranging for the acquisition of the 
securities).3!6 This elimination should be considered despite the 
administrative benefits of the current rule, which does not require a 
businesses through U.S. branches, see supra note 205, it may be wise for Treasury and 
the Service to issue regulations or rulings specifically applying the reasonable business 
needs standard to these situations. In this regard, I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009, 
supra note 308, applies the accumulated earnings tax to a bank, and in doing so 
examines reasonable business needs in this context, such as the need to maintain 
sufficient capital to satisfy Federal Reserve requirements, along with other grounds 
for reasonable accumulations that are set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b). 
313 See supra note 301. 
314 Cf Feingold & Berg, supra note 46, at 220 (appearing to recommend an 
election to treat assets as effectively connected to the extent of the amount of 
reasonable future anticipated needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business, or 
minimum amount, if greater, with such minimum amount possibly equal to the 
minimum accumulated earnings credit under the accumulated earnings tax). The 
minimum accumulated earnings credit is reduced to $150,000 for corporations whose 
principal function is performing services in the field of law, accounting, consulting, 
actuarial science, health, engineering, architecture, or performing arts. See 1.R.c. 
§ 535(c)(2). Similarly, for U.S. branches performing such services, the minimum 
amount of assets that can be elected as effectively connected should be reduced to 
$150,000. 
315 See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text. With the elimination of the 
presumption rule, there is the possibility that a foreign corporation could avoid U.S. 
net basis taxation on certain income that was previously covered - for example, 
interest income satisfying the presumption requirements where the foreign 
corporation cannot demonstrate that the underlying asset was not held for present 
U.S. business needs. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, 
because a foreign corporation typically could avoid the presumption rule if it so 
desires by failing intentionally one of its requirements, eliminating the presumption 
rule should not create a material advantage for taxpayers wanting to avoid effectively 
connected treatment. 
316 See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text. 
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determination of a business need for holding the securities.317 
Like the primary proposal, the alternative proposal to expand the 
definition of effectively connected assets would no more result in the 
effective repeal of the branch profits tax than the ability of a 
subsidiary to accumulate earnings results in the effective repeal of the 
dividend tax. With the alternative proposal (as well as the primary 
proposal), the branch profits tax would continue to affect the U.S. tax 
liability of foreign corporations' U.S. branch operations, in that the 
election to effectively connect assets would likely also produce a cost 
by subjecting the income from the affected assets to U.S. net basis 
317 In this regard, the concept of the investment securities rule, allowing a certain 
percentage of U.S. banking branch assets to consist of investment securities, may be 
consistent with an application of a reasonable business needs standard to a banking 
branch, given the need to satisfy reserve or similar requirements (although the special 
banking rules do contain a provision that can allow for the effectively connected 
treatment of stocks or securities held for the purpose of satisfying reserve 
requirements established by United States banking authorities. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.864-4(c)(5)(ii)(a)(3) (2005)); cf I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-22-009, supra note 308 
(discussing the maintenance of adequate capital to satisfy Federal Reserve 
requirements as a reasonable business need for banks); Rubinstein & Yu, supra note 
152, at 67-68 (referring to securities treated as effectively connected under the 
investment securities rule as used to satisfy reserve or similar requirements). 
Accordingly, a modification of the investment securities rule may be appropriate in 
order to approximate a reasonable business needs determinant if the current rule 
does not adequately do so. Aside from the presumption rule and the ability of 
banking branches to effectively connect investment securities, the effectively 
connected rules appear to be consistent with the reasonable business needs standard 
under the accumulated earnings tax, as these rules require that assets either be held 
for present business needs (in the case of the asset-use test) or directly relate to the 
operation of the U.S. business (in the case of the business activities test, special 
banking rules with regard to loans, or foreign effectively connected rules). See supra 
notes 103-38 and accompanying text. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.864-4 (2005), 
1.864-5 (1997), 1.864-6 (1972). 
As noted earlier, some consideration should be given to excluding foreign banks 
from having the election to effectively connect investment assets. See supra note 234. 
Nevertheless, under this alternative proposal for an effectively connected election, it 
may be appropriate to include foreign banks even if that is not the case under the 
primary proposal. This is because the alternative proposal also may call for the 
elimination of the ability of foreign banks to effectively connect investment securities 
having no relationship to the U.S. business (as discussed above). Thus, this proposal 
may result in limiting a U.S. banking branch's ability to retain earnings. 
Consequently, the alternative proposal arguably should apply to U.S. banking 
branches so that they do not have more flexibility in retaining earnings than do 
similarly situated U.S. subsidiaries, even though in both cases second-level taxes may 
be avoidable by reducing liabilities that are taken into account for U.S. tax purposes. 
1292 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:1219 
taxation.3lB Moreover, as compared to the primary proposal, a foreign 
corporation would have less ability to eliminate its liability under the 
branch profits tax by electing to treat a sufficient amount of assets as 
being effectively connected, because of the requirement that the 
assets be held for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business.319 
3. Potential Policy Conflicts 
The alternative proposal to provide foreign corporations with an 
election to effectively connect assets gives rise to potential conflicts 
with recognized policies that are similar both in their type and 
resolution to those raised by the primary proposal. In this regard, the 
alternative proposal should not conflict with the policies underlying 
the effectively connected income rules, especially if stock is not 
eligible for election.320 Indeed, because the assets would need to be 
held for the reasonable needs of the U.S. business in order to be 
eligible for effectively connected treatment, the alternative proposal 
may even be consistent with the language of section 864(c)(2)(A), 
which takes into account whether the assets are used or held for use in 
the conduct of the U.S. business.321 
318 See supra notes 253-59 and accompanying text. 
319 As with the primary proposal, the alternative proposal also should contain the 
analogue to the personal holding company tax that is discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 249-252. As a result, the Service could prevent excessive 
accumulations of effectively connected E&P by treating elected assets as non-U.S. 
assets based on either an objective standard (the personal holding company tax 
analogue) or a subjective standard (the accumulated earnings tax analogue), similar 
to the application of the penalty taxes in the case of a U.S. subsidiary. 
320 See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text. 
321 A "reasonable needs of the U.S. business" standard, which includes assets 
held for future expansion, may well be consistent with the language of the committee 
reports. See S. REP. No. 1707, supra note 260,1966-2 C.B. at 1072 (stating "[t]hus, for 
example, are the assets held for future, or remittent, use in the business?"); H.R. REP. 
No. 1450, supra note 130, 1966-2 c.B. at 977 (same). In particular, the House 
technical explanation focuses on the connection between the asset and the needs of 
the U.S. business, without limiting this to present needs. While the examples 
provided are consistent with a present business needs approach, they do not appear to 
foreclose taking into account future business needs in determining effectively 
connected status. See H.R. REP. No. 1450, supra note 130, 1966-2 C.B. at 1008-1009. 
Nevertheless, the regulations reject such an approach, and instead interpret the 
statute as requiring a present business need in order to effectively connect assets and 
income under the asset-use test (subject to the presumption rule, which is discussed at 
supra notes 115, 128-33 and accompanying text). See supra notes 113-14,126-27 and 
accompanying text. 
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As with the primary proposal, there would be limits on the ability 
of a foreign corporation to strategically elect effectively connected 
status for investment assets in order to increase its interest expense 
deduction under Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5. These would include the 
possible nonimputation of liabilities on assets affected by the election, 
an annual cap on the amount of assets eligible for the election (no 
greater than the amount needed to reduce the dividend equivalent 
amount to zero), as well as restrictions on the amount of currently 
deductible interest pursuant to the earnings stripping rule.322 
Moreover, the alternative proposal would contain an additional curb 
on possible manipulation resulting from the requirement that elected 
assets be held for the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's 
U.S. business. 
The alternative proposal would cause greater concerns of 
administrability as compared to primary proposal. This results from 
requiring a determination of whether an investment is held to meet 
the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's U.S. business. This 
determination would incorporate the test used under the accumulated 
earnings tax, which involves somewhat vague standards and potential 
enforceability difficulties.323 Nevertheless, the ability to elect 
effectively connected status for investment assets should reduce the 
number of situations where it is necessary to apply the asset-use test 
and its fact specific standards,324 which may be equally vague and 
difficult to apply and enforce.325 Consequently, the alternative 
proposal for providing an election to effectively connect assets may 
result mostly in administrative tradeoffs rather than additional 
burdens. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The branch profits tax is founded on the policy of tax neutrality 
with respect to the form of conducting a business, yet as currently 
322 See supra notes 285-89 and accompanying text. 
323 See Warner & Byrne, supra note 311, at A-I (pointing out that the 
accumulated earnings tax is rarely imposed on most corporations, and that the 
Service's failure to recognize situations when the tax applies is due to the complexities 
of determining the necessary intent to avoid the shareholder level tax, as well as 
accounting rules and calculations for E&P and reasonable business needs). 
324 This is true because taxpayers desiring effectively connected treatment for 
investment assets may be electing such treatment under the more liberal reasonable 
business needs standard, rather than having the determination made under the asset-
use test's present business needs standard. 
325 See supra note 284. 
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implemented the provision does not adequately advance this concept. 
This article proposes several changes to the branch profits tax that 
both promote neutrality and are consistent with other recognized 
policies governing the taxation of U.S. branches of foreign 
corporations. Specifically, I recommend the following reforms: (i) 
eliminate the potential for recapture upon the termination of a U.S. 
branch where a foreign corporation elects to reduce its U.S. liabilities, 
(ii) remove the U.S. booked liability limitation under the election to 
reduce U.S. liabilities, and (iii) provide foreign corporations with an 
election to treat investments generating U.S. source income as 
effectively connected assets.326 With these changes, foreign 
corporations with U.S. branches generally would have a choice of 
whether to incur a second-level tax or instead have (or continue to 
have) the income on invested earnings taxed by the United States on a 
net basis. Thus, the branch profits tax would function more like the 
dividend tax in the U.S. subsidiary setting, thereby promoting the 
neutrality goals underlying the provision. 
326 Consideration should be given to excluding stock as an asset that is eligible for 
elective effectively connected treatment. A foreign corporation should not be 
permitted to elect effectively connected treatment for a greater amount of assets than 
is necessary to reduce its dividend equivalent amount to zero for a particular year. 
The proposal to provide foreign corporations with an election to effectively 
connect investment assets assumes that there are no changes in applying the 
accumulated earnings tax to a V.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation. If a change 
does occur so that the accumulated earnings tax is potentially applicable in all cases to 
a wholly owned V.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation, this article recommends that 
the election be available only for V.S. source investment assets that are held to meet 
the reasonable needs of the foreign corporation's V.S. business. 
Some consideration should be given to excluding foreign banks under both the 
primary and alternative proposals for providing an effectively connected election. 
